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Technical Standards, Intellectual Property, and 
Competition—A Holistic View 
Nuno Pires de Carvalho
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TENSION BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS
1
 
Much has been written lately about the interaction of intellectual 
property with technical standards. Commentators often look at the 
interaction from the perspective of one particular field of intellectual 
property, generally patents. However, the same standard that includes 
patented technologies may also be copyrighted and trademarked. 
Therefore, only a holistic approach that examines the various 
 
 * Nuno Pires de Carvalho serves the Secretariat of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), Geneva, Switzerland, as Director of the Intellectual Property and 
Competition Policy Division. All views and opinions are the author’s own and do not 
necessarily coincide with the views of the Secretariat or of WIPO Member States. 
 1.  This Article relies on the definitions of technical standards provided by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The TBT 
distinguishes between mandatory standards (which it designates as “technical regulations”) and 
voluntary ones (which it names simply as “standards”). Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 117, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter TBT]. Paragraph I 
of Annex I of the TBT defines technical regulations as follows: 
Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling [sic] requirements as they apply to a product, 
process or production method. 
Voluntary standards are defined by Paragraph 2 as follows: 
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and 
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling [sic] 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method. 
Id. 
In this Article, the terms technical standards and standards, without further qualification, 
refer to both categories. 
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problems and solutions concerning the acquisition and use of 
different standard-related intellectual property can comparatively 
explain how that interaction works.
2
  
In general, the tension that exists between intellectual property 
and standards arises from irreconcilable objectives. The main purpose 
of intellectual property is to differentiate products and services, as 
well as the businesses that produce and sell them.
3
 Conversely, the 
 
 2.  On the interface between intellectual property and standards, see, e.g., Mark A. 
Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1889 (2002), and Renata Hesse, The Antitrust Division and SSOs: Continuing the Dialogue 
ANSI Intellectual Prop. Rights Policy Comm. Meeting (Nov. 8 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/288580.pdf. It should be noted that the titles of 
many books, articles and studies that address this topic mention intellectual property, but in 
reality then tend to focus on patents exclusively. That is unfortunate, because such a selective 
approach to the interaction of intellectual property with standards may lead to the misguided 
idea that patents are the only field of intellectual property where that interaction occurs. That is 
not true. Copyrights and trademarks are also greatly affected by the operation of technical 
standards, as will be described in this Article. There are, however, a few exceptions to that 
reductionist analysis. On the interface between patents and copyrights—but not trademarks—
with standards, see, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of 
Standard-setting Issues under the Patent, Copyright and Antitrust Laws, 45 IDEA 331 (2003). 
On the interface between patents and standards—but with a very brief reference to 
trademarks—see, e.g., Knut Blind et al., Study on the Interplay between Standards and 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), Final Report (2011), available at ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/european-standards/files/standards_policy/ipr-workshop/ipr_study_final_report_en.pdf. 
On the interface between standards and copyrights, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Questioning 
Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2007). 
 3.  All the many fields of intellectual property, from copyrights to trade secrets, from 
patents to geographical indications, from designs to traditional knowledge, have a common 
element that operates as an agglutination factor: their differentiating function. That function is 
grounded on well-established economic theory. Edward Chamberlin has proposed the theory of 
monopolistic competition as a more realistic alternative to the opposing situations of perfect (or 
pure) competition, at one pole, and pure monopoly, at the other. In a situation of perfect 
competition, the products sold by various sellers on the relevant market are entirely 
homogenous. Therefore, sellers do not have the power to set the price, because consumers feel 
free (and are capable) to shift from one product to the other when they see a price increase. 
However, this is an extremely rare situation, if it ever happens. For example, if ten products 
were absolutely identical and interchangeable, the respective manufacturers and merchants 
would still struggle to beat rivals: they would differentiate products by pricing, timing, location, 
or building consumer loyalty (by means of advertisement). Chamberlin proposed that by 
introducing differences in products, competitors would be able to acquire a certain amount of 
power to set prices—up to a certain level, beyond which consumers would feel motivated to 
seek a substitute. EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56–70 
(1933). 
 The existence of differences eliminates the homogeneity of products: they cease to be 
completely substitutable. A Blackberry and an iPhone are substitutable to the extent they are 
both third-generation cell phones, but they are not complete substitutes because they perform 
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objective of standards is to harmonize products, services, and 
processes. Intellectual property ensures exclusivity and 
alternativeness
4
—so that each entrepreneur introduces his or her own 
 
different functions. To the extent consumers are willing to pay a premium price to continue 
loyalty to either of the devices, sellers are able to set prices without concern for the potential 
reaction by competitors. The extent of this willingness will be larger or smaller depending on 
the amount of differentiating features between cell phones. Therefore, when a new Blackberry 
or iPhone model comes to the market, consumers will be price insensitive to a certain extent. 
They will be locked-in to their personal preferences. This limited capacity to set prices based on 
differentiation was characterized by Chamberlin as monopolistic competition. Id. at 68–70. 
 The virtue of the theory of monopolistic competition is that it emphasizes the positive 
effects of differentiation. But one has to take into consideration two caveats. In legal terms, 
monopolistic competition is an oxymoron. Otherwise, every time a manufacturer introduced a 
differentiating feature in a given product, with the effect of locking consumers in (or with the 
intent of doing it), he would be guilty of violating the Sherman Act. See Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2 (2014). However, monopolistic competition is not a situation of monopoly, because 
entry is free and substitutes are available. Second, product differentiation should be understood 
in a much broader sense than proposed by the theory. Differentiation does not necessarily 
concern a product in a direct way, but rather the whole business that lies in the background of 
the product or service. Under this broader approach, even commodities are differentiated—this 
explains why intellectual property is also important for commodities. “There is no such a thing 
as a commodity. All goods and services are differentiable.” Theodore Levitt, Marketing Success 
through Differentiation—Of Anything, HARV. BUS. REV. 83 (Jan. 1980). 
 In a groundbreaking article, Theodore Levitt has persuasively demonstrated that there are 
two possible ways of introducing differentiation in all sorts of products: by augmenting the 
product or by lowering prices. Id. at 84, 87. Product augmentation can come in many different 
ways, from modifications in technical features and design to external services that accompany 
the product. Id. at 87. As an example of external services, Levitt mentions warehousing 
management advice and training programs for the employees of the distributors of health and 
beauty aids. Commodities such as “primary metals, grains, chemicals, plastics, and money” are 
also subject to differentiation. Id. at 83. Commodity suppliers are differentiated by trade names 
and delivery methods. Products, services, and businesses can be differentiated by means of 
internal differences (new technical features, designs, quality, origin, reputation) and external 
differences (prices, location, courtesy treatment, technical assistance, loyalty programs). Each 
of those differences constitutes, directly or indirectly, intellectual property subject matter. Id. at 
87–88. 
 4.  Alternativeness is a direct consequence of intellectual property’s differentiating 
function. Every intellectual property asset is susceptible of being alternated. This means that, 
once a business creates or acquire an intellectual property right, and it covers an asset of interest 
to competitors, the latter should be able to create or acquire their own intellectual property or 
use assets in the public domain. In this manner, ownership of an intellectual property right 
should not be a barrier to competition. The principle of alternativeness was noted by the United 
States Supreme Court in the context of patents in Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) 
(“A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all 
other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever.”). Alternativeness has 
been reasserted several times since then. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113, 119 
(1853); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1853) (distinguishing between patenting a 
process and a machine). Alternativeness has also been affirmed in the context of copyright. See, 
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differentiating features in products and services—whereas standards 
imply generalized and uniform obedience. It follows that 
standardization may inhibit the free operation of intellectual property 
and vice-versa. Products and processes covered by patents, utility 
models, or designs may not be available to all potential users of those 
standards that incorporate them. The exclusivity produced by those 
rights may give rise to essential facilities.
5
 Copyrighted standards 
demand the payment of fees to those who want to obtain a copy. 
Trademarks also constrain third-party use of standards. 
The undeniable tension between intellectual property and 
standards can be explained by a more general and basic notion that 
stems from the economic organization of society. Standards are the 
result of regulation, be it government regulation or industry self-
regulation. Standards impinge on the operation of the free market, 
because they reduce the various possible ways of manufacturing 
and/or producing services, and therefore they reduce consumer 
choices. Standards may be justified by economic efficiency, cost 
reduction, and quality improvement—even in the context of 
innovation when they concern new products and services—but they 
nevertheless impose constraints on the ability of businesses and 
consumers to choose. Intellectual property is the opposite. It requires 
a regulatory framework, in the sense that exclusive rights are granted 
or acknowledged by the intervention of governments and/or courts.
6
 
 
e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp. (Data Gen. I), 761 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D. 
Mass. 1991), aff’d (Data Gen. II), 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). And in the context of trade 
dress and designs, see L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1129–30 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993). 
 5.  See discussion on essential facilities, infra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 6.  However, because of the differentiating role intellectual property plays in free 
markets, expressions of intellectual property throughout history have arisen spontaneously, 
meaning that intellectual property assets have been created and used as tools of differentiation 
even before lawmakers stepped up to regulate them. See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, A 
ESTRUTURA DOS SISTEMAS DE PATENTES E DE MARCAS—PASSADO, PRESENTE E FUTURO 63 
(2009). Perhaps the most notorious examples of spontaneous appropriation of intangible 
differentiating assets are trade secrets, which correspond to an informal mechanism of private 
appropriation of knowledge, and trademarks, which appeared as symbolic means of replacing 
the physical presence of the merchant in long distance deals. Id. at 126–28, 472. For example, 
private merchants in ancient Sumer used distinctive signs, in the form of seals, to trademark 
their work. Id. at 472–78. The first written statute that currently remains in almost its entirety—
the Code of Hammurabi, 1,750 BCE—had provisions that reflected long standing practices of 
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But intellectual property is a fundamental foundation of free markets, 
in which rivals struggle to lure clients and clients have consequently 
a right of choice. Paradoxically, intellectual property is the product of 
market regulation—in the sense that the acquisition, use, and loss of 
rights are established by law—for the sake of market freedom, 
whereas, by a vivid contrast, standardization is the product of market 
regulation that to a large extent curtails rivalry in invention and in 
offering competing products and services to consumers. 
However, if there is a natural tension between intellectual 
property and standards, avenues exist that can prevent the tension 
from becoming an unsurpassable barrier. In Part II, this Article will 
examine how numerous nations’ legislative bodies and courts have 
addressed this tension. Part II will discuss patents and standards. Part 
III considers copyright and standards. In Part IV, trademarks and 
standards are considered, particularly through the lens of public 
health. Part V will provide an eagle-eye overview of the tension 
between intellectual property and standards. 
For the purposes of this Article, there is a distinction between 
mandatory standards and voluntary standards (sometimes designated 
as “voluntary consensus standards”). Mandatory standards are 
established by a statute, regulation, directive, or any other written 
norm emanated from a law-making public body, such as a parliament, 
a government, or a governmental agency with the authority to require 
certain behavior. In other words, mandatory standards are those with 
which citizens and firms must comply, under penalties for non-
compliance.
7
 Voluntary standards are established by the industry 
directly (through arrangements between businesses) or indirectly 
(when elaborated by standard setting organizations (“SSOs”) or 
standard developing organization (“SDOs”)). Many voluntary 
standards are elaborated per the initiative of SSOs, which 
subsequently persuade businesses to adopt them. Companies may 
also collaborate to develop voluntary standards that harmonize 
 
trade secret appropriation. Id. at 43–46. See The Code of Hammurabi, § 188 (L. W. King 
Trans., 1910). 
 7.  See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(discussing whether copyrights can be claimed in mandatory standards, i.e., standards that have 
become “the law”). 
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patterns of production so as to reduce costs and facilitate the creation 
of interoperable products and services.
8
 As far as the interaction of 
standards with intellectual property is concerned, the most important 
distinction is the one that separates mandatory from voluntary 
standards. As we shall see, the mandatory nature of standards may 
transform the subject matter of intellectual property, which is per se 
susceptible to being alternated by competitors willing to make and 
sell substitute products and services, into essential facilities. On the 
other hand, voluntary standards may generate different competition-
related issues, depending on the time the intellectual property is 
acquired and enforced. As we shall see, the impact of intellectual 
property rights—particularly, patents—may vary depending on 
whether they are exercised during the elaboration of the standard or 
afterwards, when participants prepare for their implementation. 
II. PATENTS AND STANDARDS
9
 
When standards are mandatory, their utilization may be impacted 
by the exclusive rights arising from standard essential patents (i.e., 
patents covering inventions whose exploitation is necessary for the 
operation of the standard). Because of the mandatory nature of those 
standards, competitors of the patent holder have no way to find 
technical solutions around the claimed matter. The exercise of the 
exclusive rights by the holder, albeit in perfect conformity with the 
letter and the spirit of patent laws, would contradict the public policy 
that is behind the setting of a mandatory standard. According to that 
public policy—which seeks to meet the goals of collective interest 
 
 8.  See, e.g., Korea Fair Trade Commission, Model Operating Guidelines for Standard 
Setting Organizations for Voluntary Compliance with the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade 
Act (2012), at II.1.A, available at eng.ftc.go.kr. 
 9.  Reference is made here to patents, but the discussion that follows also applies to other 
areas of intellectual property that may generate exclusive rights in ideas that are part of a 
standard. In general, those ideas are of a technical nature, so reference is also made to utility 
models and layout-designs of integrated circuits and plant varieties. Where the standards 
incorporate esthetical elements, industrial designs may also be relevant. However, industrial 
property rights do not generate identical prerogatives and burdens. Therefore, even if the 
interaction of patents with standards may have an impact very similar to the one it has on other 
titles in technical ideas, there may also be significant disparities. Such disparities, however, are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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such as environmental standards, public health requirements, etc.—it 
is in the public interest that all manufacturers of the products that are 
covered by the standard precisely obey its instructions. Actually, it is 
the existence of public interest in compliance with such standards that 
make them appropriate to be set by governmental bodies as 
mandatory, thereby acquiring the nature of binding laws. To the 
extent that manufacturers are required to use a patented invention to 
meet mandatory standards imposed upon it, the use of that invention 
becomes critical for competitors to be able to compete with the patent 
owner in the relevant market. Such a patent becomes, therefore, an 
essential facility to the patent holder’s competitors.
10
  
Inventions that are the subject of mandatory standards generally 
exhibit four characteristics that cumulatively give rise to an essential 
facility situation, as discussed by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.
11
: 
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a 
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the 
essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a 
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.
12 
The inclusion of a given manufacturer’s patents in a mandatory 
standard gives that manufacturer a competitive advantage, which 
cannot be justified by technical efficiency or other business merit, but 
rather results from governmental intervention. Therefore, in those 
 
 10.  The notion of essential facility was established by the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Terminal Ry. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) as follows: 
If, as we have already said, the combination of two or more mere terminal companies 
into a single system does not violate the prohibition of the statute against contracts and 
combinations in restraint of interstate commerce, it is because such a combination may 
be of the greatest public utility. But when, as here, the inherent conditions are such as 
to prohibit any other reasonable means of entering the city, the combination of every 
such facility under the exclusive ownership and control of less than all of the 
companies under compulsion to use them violates both the first and second sections of 
the act, in that it constitutes a contract or combination in restraint of commerce among 
the states and an attempt to monopolize commerce among the states which must pass 
through the gateway at St. Louis. 
Id. at 409. 
 11.  MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).  
 12.  Id. at 1132–33.  
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countries that, as the United States, admit the granting of compulsory 
licenses to remedy anticompetitive refusals to license patent rights, if 
the patent holder refuses to license the standard’s essential patents on 
reasonable commercial terms to any competitor who must apply the 
standard, a compulsory license ensues. This solution is found, for 
example, in Section 308 of the Clean Air Act: 
Whenever the Attorney General determines upon application 
of the Administrator— 
(1) that— 
 (A) in the implementation of the requirements of section 
111, 112, or 202 of this Act, a right under any United States 
letters patent, which is being used or intended for public or 
commercial use and not otherwise reasonably available, is 
necessary to enable any person required to comply with such 
limitation to so comply, and 
 (B) there are no reasonable alternative methods to 
accomplish such purpose, and 
(2) that the unavailability of such right may result in a 
substantial lessening of competition or tendency to create a 
monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the 
country, the Attorney General may so certify to a district court 
of the United States, which may issue an order requiring the 
person who owns such patent to license it on such reasonable 
terms and conditions as the court, after hearing, may 
determine. Such certification may be made to the district court 
for the district in which the person owning the patent resides, 
does business, or is found.
13
 
Section 308 does not mention the requirement of a prior attempt to 
obtain a voluntary license (on reasonable commercial terms) by the 
license grantee, as required by Article 31(b) of the TRIPS 
 
 13.  Sections 111 and 112 of the Clean Air Act refer to standards of performance for 
stationary sources. Clean Air Act §§ 111, 112; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412 (2012). Section 202 
refers to motor vehicle emission and fuel standards. Clean Air Act § 202; 42 U.S.C. § 7521 
(1990).  
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Agreement, that the United States, as a WTO member, is bound.
14
 
Such an attempt, however, seems to be implied in the language “not 
otherwise reasonably available.” When the patent owner agrees to 
license a mandatory standard essential patent (MSEP) on commercial 
reasonable terms, one can expect that the Attorney General would 
determine that the patent right is reasonably available for the 
purposes of that section, and therefore there would be no reason to 
certify the need for a mandatory license.
15
 Moreover, except “in the 
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use,” the need for a 
prior attempt of a voluntary license is a requirement imposed by 
Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement.  
Even though it seems that Section 308 has no parallel in the 
statutes of other WTO or World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Members, almost every other major jurisdiction has in their 
patent statutes provisions that provide for the same solution, 
however, on a more general, public interest basis.
16
 
During the elaboration of mandatory standards, the patent holder 
does not have a duty to inform the SSO of the patent. The reason is 
that a mandatory standard is imposed with the coercive authority of 
law, and thus it does not matter whether the SSO was aware or 
 
 14.  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 31(b), 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS Agreement 
constitutes Annex 1C to the Agreement that Established the WTO. See supra note 1. 
 15.  The “reasonable availability” of the patent right would stem from the patentee’s offer 
to license it. However, such an offer should be made under reasonable, fair, and non-
discriminatory terms (FRAND), otherwise, the Attorney General would need to intervene. For a 
discussion of FRAND terms, see infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 16.  There is a parallel situation in the European Union, but not in the context of MSEPs, 
that causes an intellectual property intangible asset to become an essential facility. This relates 
to safety-related tests concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market. In 
2009, the European Parliament and Council passed a regulation requiring junior market entrants 
to avoid duplicative testing and studying on vertebrate animals. Commission Regulation 
1107/2009, art. 61, 2009 O.J. (L 309) 31 (EC). When the junior entrant needs access to the data 
owned and controlled by the senior entrant, both companies “shall make every effort to ensure 
that they share tests and studies involving vertebrate animals.” Id. art. 61 ¶ 3. And in the event 
the data owner does not agree to license the data to the junior entrant, “[t]he failure to reach 
agreement . . . shall not prevent the competent authority of that Member State from using the 
test and study reports involving vertebrate animals for the purpose of the application of the 
prospective applicant.” Id. ¶ 5. For the full text of the Directive as well as of all European 
Union statutes, see eur-lex.europa.eu. 
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unaware of the existence of one or more standard-essential patent(s). 
In the case of voluntary standards, it is important that the SSO must 
be aware of the existence of the patent so that it can exercise a choice 
(when available) of technologies and avoid (when possible) the 
eventual blockage caused by one or more standard-essential patent(s). 
In other words, the disclosure of patents during the elaboration of 
voluntary standards permits that choices be made by the SSO.  
In the case of mandatory standards, choices are not important 
because patent owners are not allowed to refuse to license. In the 
absence of a duty to disclose, the SSO that elaborates a voluntary 
standard has no authority to oblige the patentee to license his/her 
standard-essential patent. This is not, of course, the case for 
mandatory standards where it does not matter whether the patent 
holder acted in good faith or not because he is powerless to oppose 
his or her private rights to the enforcement of a “law.” The fact that 
the patentee has no duty to inform the SSO about the existence of a 
patent (or of a patent application) on some essential part of the 
mandatory standard during the elaboration phase has no impact on 
the industry’s use of the standard. If he or she attempts to slow the 
elaboration of the standard, or to sue potential users after its 
elaboration, the patent holder will be sanctioned by a compulsory 
license. The terms of such a license will be primarily defined by a 
governmental authority, and, eventually by a court.
17
 
 
 17.  A commentator has invoked this same understanding to overcome the ambiguity of 
certain provisions of the Regulations of National Standards Involving Patents recently adopted 
by China’s State Intellectual Property Office and National Standardization Administration. See 
Dan Prud’homme, FRAND and Other requirements in China’s Announcement on Releasing 
(Provisional) Administration Regulations of National Standards Involving Patents, 9 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. & PRACT. 346 (2014). Analyzing the absence of a solution in the case where a 
mandatory standard essential patent holder (or applicant) refuses to license his or her rights 
either to the SSO or third parties, the commentator wrote: 
However, the present Regulations mandate that a patentee or applicant must 
effectively license their patents for inclusion in compulsory national standards, 
whereas they must negotiate with the relevant authorities if negotiations with other 
parties fail and there is no provision for a lack of agreement with the authorities (for 
reference, the 2009 draft of the regulations from SAC also included the alternative of 
granting a compulsory licence [sic] when another resolution could not be reached). 
This raises the question as to what form such negotiations with the authorities will 
take, and appears to mean that the patentee/patent applicant absolutely must ultimately 
license their patents for inclusion in compulsory national standards, though it is not 
explicitly required that this is done on FRAND terms. 
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The situation of patent rights in voluntary standards is different. 
Because they are voluntary, any company not interested in using the 
standard may resort to competing techniques to make substitute 
products. Such companies may also create other standards. It is not 
uncommon for several standards to compete in the same industry and 
concern the same product.
18
 
This means that, in the case of voluntary standards, the essential 
facility doctrine does not necessarily justify compulsory licenses. The 
solutions to problems created by voluntary standards may vary 
depending on whether rights are acquired and enforced (actually or 
potentially) during the elaboration phase or afterwards. A factor that 
also counts is whether the voluntary standard essential patent (VSEP) 
holder or applicant is a member of the SSO or not. 
There is a presiding principle that rules over VSEPs: good faith. 
Here, good faith means not withholding information on the actual or 
potential existence of conflicting patent rights; not artificially or 
unduly acquiring rights in VSEPs; and full and unreserved 
compliance with the FRAND terms established by the relevant 
 
Id. at 348. FRAND stands for “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” terms. It refers to the 
conditions under which voluntary standard essential patent holders must conclude licensing 
agreements with third parties. FRANDs are systematically included in the regulations of SSOs 
that precede the elaboration of a new standard and apply to all companies that accept to join the 
elaboration work. See, e.g., Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its 
Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings 
Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp., Feb. 13, 2012, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-division-its-
decision-close-its-investigations. 
 18.  Two of the most remarkable examples of competing voluntary standards were the 
VHS and Betamax formats for video cassette recording. A commentator has suggested an 
intermediate class of standards between mandatory and permissive standards. Those would be 
“quasi-mandatory standards,” i.e., those standards that, being of voluntary adherence, are 
nevertheless so ubiquitous that a new entrant has no solution other than adhering to them. See 
Raymond T. Nimmer, Technical Standards Setting Organizations & Competition: A Case for 
Deference to Markets 9–10 (Jan., 2008), available at http://www. wlf.org/upload/Nimmer%20 
Final.pdf. However, the term that is mostly accepted to designate voluntary standards 
(consensually set by SSOs or individually) that gain wide acceptance on the market is “de facto 
standards.” See Dept. of Justice and FTC, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property 
Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, at 34 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.ftc. 
org [hereinafter DoJ/FTC Report]. 
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SSO.
19
 The first element of good faith translates into a duty of 
transparency. Failure to inform the SSO could potentially give rise to 
hold up, to the extent that the existence of VSEPs to which the holder 
denies access may frustrate the standard developing efforts or may 
create a barrier to its implementation. The second element is a 
variation of the first. It may happen that a member of an SSO amends 
patent claims or files new patent applications after the standard 
development has started, with the purpose of expanding the scope of 
enforceable rights to cover parts of the standard that would be 
otherwise non-proprietary.
20
 The third element manifests itself after 
 
 19.  See DoJ/FTC Report, supra note 18, at 36: 
[S]ome SSOs require participants to disclose the existence of IP rights that may be 
infringed by the potential users of a standard in development. SSOs also may require 
SSO members to commit to license any of their IP that is essential to an SSO standard 
on “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (“RAND”) terms. [note omitted] Some SSOs 
and SSO members would like to further mitigate hold up by requiring IP holders to 
commit to specific licensing terms before selecting a particular technology as part of a 
standard. 
Id. 
 20.  This particular issue was the subject of analysis by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court 
dismissed a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) order against Rambus on two grounds: first, the 
FTC failed to give evidence that Rambus’ concealed intent to file for patent applications was an 
act of monopolization for purposes of the Sherman Act: 
Here, the Commission expressly left open the likelihood that JEDEC would have 
standardized Rambus’s technologies even if Rambus had disclosed its intellectual 
property. Under this hypothesis, JEDEC lost only an opportunity to secure a RAND 
commitment from Rambus. But loss of such a commitment is not a harm to 
competition from alternative technologies in the relevant markets. [] Indeed, had 
JEDEC limited Rambus to reasonable royalties and required it to provide licenses on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, we would expect less competition from alternative 
technologies, not more; high prices and constrained output tend to attract competitors, 
not to repel them. . . . Thus, if JEDEC, in the world that would have existed but for 
Rambus’s deception, would have standardized the very same technologies, Rambus’s 
alleged deception cannot be said to have had an effect on competition in violation of 
the antitrust laws; JEDEC’s loss of an opportunity to seek favorable licensing terms is 
not as such an antitrust harm. Yet the Commission did not reject this as being a 
possible—perhaps even the more probable—effect of Rambus’s conduct. We hold, 
therefore, that the Commission failed to demonstrate that Rambus’s conduct was 
exclusionary, and thus to establish its claim that Rambus unlawfully monopolized the 
relevant markets. 
Id. at 466–67 (citations omitted). Second, the court dismissed the order because Rambus had 
committed to disclose patent rights already obtained and applications already filed, but not 
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the standard is approved. An opportunistic VSEP-holder participant 
may take standard users by surprise and sue or threaten to sue on 
grounds of infringement. When asked for an authorization to use, the 
patent holder will charge royalties above the levels determined to be 
reasonable under FRAND terms. This is a practice generally known 
as patent ambush.
21
 
Of course, the observations above concern patent holders or 
applicants that participate in the elaboration of a standard. However, 
it is not uncommon that the elaboration of a standard requires the 
 
future patent applications for subject matter that constituted trade secrets before the applications 
were filed: 
The most disclosure-friendly of those policies is JEDEC Manual No. 21-I, published in 
October 1993, which refers to “the obligation of all participants to inform the meeting 
of any knowledge they may have of any patents, or pending patents, that might be 
involved in the work they are undertaking” (“For the purpose of this policy, the word 
‘patented’ also includes items and processes for which a patent has been applied and 
may be pending.”) (referring to “technical information covered by [a] patent or 
pending patent”). [note omitted] This language speaks fairly clearly of disclosure 
obligations related to patents and pending patent applications, but says nothing of 
unfiled work in progress on potential amendments to patent applications. 
Id. at 468. 
Even assuming that any evidence of unwritten disclosure expectations would survive a 
possible narrowing effect based upon the written directive of Manual 21-I, the 
vagueness of any such expectations would nonetheless remain an obstacle. One would 
expect that disclosure expectations ostensibly requiring competitors to share 
information that they would otherwise vigorously protect as trade secrets would 
provide “clear guidance” and “define clearly what, when, how, and to whom the 
members must disclose.” This need for clarity seems especially acute where disclosure 
of those trade secrets itself implicates antitrust concerns; JEDEC involved, after all, 
collaboration by competitors. . . . For reasons similar to those that make vague but 
broad disclosure obligations among competitors unlikely, it seems to us unlikely that 
JEDEC participants placed themselves under such a sweeping and early duty to 
disclose, triggered by the mere chance that a technology might someday (in this case, 
more than two years later) be formally proposed for standardization. 
Id. at 468–69 (citations omitted). 
 21.  Patent ambush has been explained in the following terms: 
[Patent ambush] deals with a member of an SSO that omits to transfer the information 
to the SSO of an SEP, and when the standard has been adopted, and the members and 
other firms have invested in it, the patentee emerges and, knowing the exit cost will be 
large, charges a royalty rate that reflects both the exit costs and the value of the 
standard as such, while the patent may only cover a small part of the standardized 
technology. 
BJÖRN LUNDQVIST, STANDARDIZATION UNDER EU COMPETITION RULES AND US ANTITRUST 
LAWS—THE RISE AND THE LIMITS OF SELF-REGULATION 300–01 (2014). 
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adoption of one of several equivalent technologies.
22
 Sometimes it is 
the very existence of several competing technologies that encourages 
the elaboration of the standard, so as to facilitate the invention of new 
interoperable products. The standardization of a small number of 
interfaces focuses the manufacturers of interoperable products on a 
limited scope of technology. Such a focus increases the chances of 
success in inventing interoperable products and ensures a larger 
market.
23
 
The situation changes if the VSEP holder is not a member of the 
SSO team elaborating the standard. In this case, the patentee has no 
duty to inform the elaborating party about the existence of patents. 
After all, the patentee in this case has no commitment, contractual or 
moral, with the SSO. It may also happen that the VSEP holder does 
not know about the elaboration of a voluntary standard by the 
industry or a private SSO.  
When a VSEP holder breaches the duty of good faith, generally 
the solution is the denial of the breacher’s request for an injunction 
against patent infringement and the compulsory application of 
FRAND terms.
24
 The imposition of this solution, however, depends 
on a judicial finding of a breach of the duty to inform as well on the 
 
 22.  In fact, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia acknowledged in Rambus 
Inc., “Before an SSO adopts a standard, there is often vigorous competition among different 
technologies for incorporation into that standard.” Rambus Inc., 522 F.3d at 459. 
 23.  “Standards that facilitate interoperability are critical in high tech industries and 
increasingly raise antitrust issues, whether set through a standard setting organization, by ad hoc 
groups of competitors, or by a single dominant firm.” See Intellectual Property Committee, 
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Resources Relating to Antitrust and Standards Setting (Revised 
July 21, 2003), available at apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-ip/pdf/ssr.pdf. But 
interoperability is likewise of the essence in certain more traditional industries, such as the 
railroad industry. Without interoperability, trains would not be allowed to travel from one 
country to another. Standardization, therefore, is crucial for not only for the technological 
development of the industry but also for its very operation. On the importance of 
interoperability for the railroad industry and the role of standards in ensuring it, see, e.g., 
Technical specifications for interoperability, Eur. Ry. Agency, www.era.europa.eu/Core-
Activities/Interoperability/Pages/TechnicalSpecifications.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).  
 24.  For an overview of the availability of injunctions under FRAND terms in various 
jurisdictions, see AIPPI, Special Committee on Patents and Standards (Q222), Availability of 
Injunctive Relief for FRAND-Committed Standard Essential Patents, Incl. FRAND-Committed 
Standard Essential Patents, Incl. FRAND-Defence in Patent Infringement Proceedings (Mar. 
2014), available at http://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/222/Report222AIPPI+report+ 
on+the+availability+of+injunctive+relief+for+FRAND-committed+standard+essential+patents 
English.pdf.  
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anticompetitive consequences of that breach. In principle, a SSO 
participant must disclose possible patent interests in technology that 
are essential to the standard so that the SSO may make an informed 
decision about the use of the claimed technology. In view of such 
information, the SSO may decide to use a different, unclaimed 
technology. But it may also require the patent holder or applicant to 
commit to FRAND licensing terms once the standard is elaborated. 
Under this second approach, the SSO would avoid overcharging 
royalties for users locked into the standard; i.e., whose costs of 
exiting the standard would be higher than those of remaining in it. 
Another aspect discussed by the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia in Rambus Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission was the 
eventual impact of new patent applications filed after the SSO started 
elaborating a new standard.
25
 In the absence of a clear commitment 
by the VSEP holder—or in the face of less than clear SSO 
regulations—no company should be held liable for failing to disclose 
trade secrets. After all, patentable subject matter constitutes trade 
secrets until it is disclosed by publication of the patent application.
26
 
As the court in Rambus Inc. reminded, agreements among 
competitors to set standards are, despite their positive aspects, 
agreements among competitors and, as such, should be examined 
with circumspection.
27
 Where patent rights are involved, the situation 
may be less worrisome because of the inherent disclosure of the 
technology involved.
28
 In other words, communication of patented 
technology among competitors amounts to communication of 
 
 25.  Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also supra note 21 and 
accompanying text. 
 26.  Before the publication of the patent application, the applicant may abandon the 
application so as to avoid the publication and therefore keep the invention secret. See 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.138 (2013). 
 27.  “JEDEC involved, after all, collaboration by competitors . . . .” Rambus Inc., 522 
F.3d at 468. 
 28.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a): 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms 
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.  
Id. 
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publicly available information. But the sharing of trade secrets among 
those same competitors may, in view of the inherent inaccessibility of 
that information, raise suspicions of anticompetitive collusion.  
In the European Union, the European Commission treats breaches 
of the duty of good faith as antitrust violations under Article 102 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
29
 
Article 102 of the TFEU provides “[a]ny abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member 
States.”
30
 As Article 102 requires a finding of a dominant position, in 
prior cases the European Commission has understood that “an 
essential patent under a standard is a market in itself and the 
proprietor is that market’s sole supplier, thus a monopolist.”
31
 In 
antitrust investigations against Motorola and Samsung, the 
Commission concluded that the refusal by an SEP holder to abide by 
previous FRAND commitments, and his or her attempt to enforce an 
injunction against a standard user willing to enter a voluntary license 
under FRAND terms was an abuse of a dominant position.
32
  
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
understands that the breach of FRAND terms, either in the form of a 
hold up or of a patent ambush, does not need to constitute an antitrust 
violation to be deemed unlawful.
33
 In other words, there is no need to 
 
 29.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 
102, Oct. 12, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 89.  
 30.  Id. 
 31.  LUNDQVIST, supra note 21, at 320. 
 32.  See Janeth Strath, Smartphone Patent Wars: European Commission Adopts Antitrust 
Decisions on Enforcement by Motorola and Samsung of Standard Essential Patents, 20 
COMPUTER & TELECOMMS. L. REV. 127 (2014). In a press conference, the Commission’s vice-
president in charge of competition policy said that, under FRAND, no licensee should be 
prevented from challenging “the validity and infringement of the SEP.” Id. at 128. 
 33.  The FTC itself has acknowledged that the existence of a clear distinction between 
practices under section 5 of the FTC Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act is a matter of 
controversy, but it stands for that position and assumes its attendant risks (namely, that section 
5 violations cannot be privately pursued). See FTC, IN THE MATTER OF NEGOTIATED DATA 
SOLUTIONS LLC, Statement, File No. 0510094, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122statement.pdf; see also Sean P. Gates, Standard-
Essential Patents and Antitrust: Of Fighting Ships and Frankenstein Monsters, 10(1) 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 1 (Oct. 2013): “And the Commission has been careful to distinguish 
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find a dominant position in the relevant market in order to determine 
the unlawfulness of the enforcement of a VSEP. This understanding 
results from the particular language of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, which declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods 
of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce.”34 This text has two prongs. 
The first prong goes beyond considerations that are moralist in 
nature, such as honesty and loyalty in trade, and extends the 
prohibition to any acts that are unlawful and that generate an 
anticompetitive advantage.
35
 The second prong corresponds to the 
traditional concept of unfair competition, as set forth in Article 10bis 
of the Paris Convention
36
 and footnote 10 of the TRIPS Agreement,
37
 
which corresponds to the notion that the unlawfulness of the act
 
between Section 5, which only the FTC can enforce, and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
the Department of Justice and private litigants may enforce.” Id. at 2. 
 34.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 35.  The breadth of the scope of section 5 of the FTC Act was noted by the Supreme Court 
in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972): 
In reality, the question is a double one: First, does § 5 empower the Commission to 
define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not 
infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws? Second, does § 5 empower 
the Commission to proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon 
consumers regardless of their nature or quality as competitive practices or their effect 
on competition? We think the statute, its legislative history, and prior cases compel an 
affirmative answer to both questions. 
Id. at 239. 
 36.  Article 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention reads: “Any act of competition contrary to 
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.” 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis(2), Mar. 20, 1883, last 
revised on July 14, 1967, last amended on Sept. 28, 1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=288514. 
 37.  Article 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement reads in part: 
“Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information 
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others 
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices10 . . .” 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 39.2. Note 10 of the TRIPS Agreement gave three 
examples of manners contrary to honest practices (but only for the purposes of protection of 
trade secrets): breach of contract, breach of confidence, and inducement to breach. Id. art. 39.2 
n.10. 
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results from its dishonest nature.
38
 The difference between the two 
prongs predominantly lies in the presence or absence of deception. 
The first prong does not require courts to morally blame entities for 
their conduct.  The second prong does. The first prong demands that 
enforcement authorities find an effective competitive advantage—
which, should have some significance, but without necessarily 
reaching the level of a position of dominance. The second prong may 
be concerned with competitive advantages, as a matter of course, 
because it concerns practices in commerce that will inherently impact 
rivals. The second prong, however, is not about competition, but 
rather about competitors—any advantage that one merchant gains 
vis-à-vis another that may have an adverse impact on consumers, and 
which does not result from efficiency, is unfair when practiced with 
dishonesty.
39
 Eventually, the broad notion of unfair competition 
 
 38.  The difficulty in finding a precise and encompassing definition of unfair competition 
has been noted since the beginnings of the Paris Union. A note explaining that difficulty was 
issued by the Bureau International de l’Union ([Paris] Union’s International Office) in 1923, in 
preparation for the Diplomatic Conference of 1925, at The Hague, which introduced the 
examples of unfair competition that constitute paragraph 3 of Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention. In conclusion, after proposing four different possible definitions, the note says: 
It is easy to verify that a definition that does not imply a certain tautology is not 
available. However, one will understand that this is about prohibiting any act that 
fraudulently or simply unlawfully impairs the free interplay of commercial and 
individual efforts, i.e., any act contrary to honest practices in commercial or industrial 
matters. 
See Bureau International de l’Union, La Lutte contre la Concurrence Déloyale—Postulats de 
Révision de la Convention [The Fight against Unfair Competition—Premises for the Review of 
the Convention], 39 LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE 12, 192 (1923) (Fr.). 
 39.  Dishonesty was acknowledged as a necessary component of unfair competition in 
early court opinions, before section 5 of the FTC Act expanded its scope and gave it a more 
objective tone. See, e.g., Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. H. Marks, 109 Cal. 529 (1895): 
In the leading case of Lee v. Haley, the whole question is condensed by the final 
conclusion of the court into the principle of law “that it is a fraud on the part of a 
defendant to set up a business under such a designation as is calculated to lead, and 
does lead, other people to suppose that his business is the business of another person.” 
If the same evil results are accomplished by the acts practiced by this defendant which 
would be accomplished by an adoption of plaintiff’s name, why should equity smile 
upon the one practice and frown upon the other? Upon what principle of law can a 
court of equity say, if you cheat and defraud your competitor in business by taking his 
name, the court will give relief against you, but if you cheat and defraud him by 
assuming a disguise of a different character your acts are beyond the law? Equity will 
not concern itself about the means by which fraud is done. It is the results arising from 
the means, it is the fraud itself, with which it deals. The foregoing principles of law do 
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adopted by Section 5 of the FTC Act facilitates the task of 
competition authorities in repressing abusive practices of SSO 
participants. To the extent that, by contrast with the enforcement of 
antitrust law, intervention does not require the finding of dominant 
market power. However, it is still necessary for courts to find the 
anticompetitive effects of the unfair practice, and in this regard courts 
may be strict, as the Court of Appeals was in Rambus Inc., when it 
held that royalty overcharging is, in principle, pro-competitive.
40
 
However, as noted above, this discussion applies to FRAND 
commitments and their breach by SSO participants. The solution in 
this scenario does not apply to VSEP holders that did not participate 
in the standard setting and, thus, have not committed themselves to 
disclose patent applications to the SSO and are not bound by the 
obligation of good faith. In this case, if the implementation of the 
standard requires the use of a patent owned by an outsider and the 
latter refuses to license, any user of that standard shall be deemed a 
patent infringer and the SSO might be deemed a contributory 
infringer.
41
 
Lock in, meaning that SSO participants may find it more costly to 
exit the standard and adopt a different technology to avoid 
infringement than to submit to the conditions imposed by the VSEP 
holder, may also appear in these circumstances.
42
 It may also happen 
 
not apply alone to the protection of parties having trade-marks and trade names. They 
reach away beyond that, and apply to all cases where fraud is practiced by one in 
securing the trade of a rival dealer; and these ways are as many and as various as the 
ingenuity of the dishonest schemer can invent. 
Id. at 540–41 (citations omitted). 
 40.  See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466: “Indeed, had JEDEC limited Rambus to reasonable 
royalties and required it to provide licenses on a nondiscriminatory basis, we would expect less 
competition from alternative technologies, not more; high prices and constrained output tend to 
attract competitors, not to repel them.” 
 41.  On contributory infringement, see 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010). 
 42.  Daryl Lim notes: 
It can be extremely costly, or even impossible as a practical matter, to redesign a 
product standard to avoid infringing a patented technology once the industry has been 
locked in. If manufacturers have begun selling products that comply with the initial 
standard, switching to a non-infringing design can be extremely costly and 
commercially unfeasible. With very high redesign costs, the threat of an injunction can 
lead to large royalty overcharges, especially for weak patents. 
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that after being implemented, the standard in question becomes 
dominant in the market. So, the enforcement of the VSEP by a third 
party might disrupt the entire market or a large part of it.
43
 
SSOs should consider these possible outcomes and act with great 
care in searching for possible third-party patents that might be 
infringed by the standard. Given the voluntary nature of the standard, 
participants may switch to another technique in the event a third party 
who holds a VSEP refuses to license or charges a high price, but that 
switch may be too costly. However, Denying the VSEP holder the 
right to enforce the patent’s exclusivity would be the same as denying 
the very nature of patent law. In other words, as a district court in 
Massachusetts held in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems 
Support Corp., third parties’ patent rights, as essential as they may be 
to the operation of a standard, are not essential facilities in the 
context of voluntary standards.
44
 
Moreover, several jurisdictions have held that a monopolist is not 
obliged to share his or her dominance with competitors if the 
dominance was not acquired in an illegal manner.
45
 To oblige holders 
 
Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse (2009) (draft), 
available at www.atrip.org/Content/Essays/Daryl%20Lim.pdf (subsequently published as Daryl 
Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse 51(4) IDEA: J.L. & Tech. 
557 (2011), available at papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1871449). 
 43.  On how standards setting and market power interrelate, see Anne Layne-Farrar &A. 
Jorge Padilla, Assessing the Link between Standard Setting and Market Power (Mar. 2010) 
available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1567026.  
 44.  See a description of this landmark opinion in note 51, infra, and accompanying text. 
 45.  An explanation of this understanding can be found in WIPO, REFUSALS TO LICENSE 
IP RIGHTS—A COMPARATIVE NOTE ON POSSIBLE APPROACHES 7 (Aug. 2013), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/refusals_license_IPRs.pdf 
[hereinafter REFUSALS TO LICENSE]:  
“Monopolists needn’t acquiesce to every demand placed upon them by competitors or 
customers; a monopolist’s duties are negative–to refrain from anticompetitive 
conduct–rather than affirmative–to promote competition. Just as the monopolist has no 
duty to deter the sale of its own equipment by promoting that of a competitor, . . . so 
too it has no duty to incur contractual liability itself by excusing its customers from 
their contractual obligations. We recognized the sufficiency of exactly that type of 
‘self-serving’ business justification in Olympia Equipment, where we observed that 
‘consumers would be worse off if a firm with monopoly power had a duty to extend 
positive assistance to new entrants, or having extended it voluntarily a duty to continue 
it indefinitely. The imposition of such a duty would make firms that possessed or 
might be thought to possess monopoly power, however laudably obtained, timid about 
. . . competing with new entrants.’ By the same token, consumers would be worse off 
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of lawfully acquired dominant positions to assist competitors would 
actually be a disservice to free competition, because such an 
obligation would provide no incentive for potential entrants to create 
their own competitive advantages.  
It is worth emphasizing, however, that this discussion concerns 
only those uses of standards that comprise patented technology. This, 
in general, does not concern standards that are relevant for the 
making of interoperable products. The reason is that, in general, 
manufacturers of interoperable products do not need to use the 
standard—they only need to know it, so that they can adapt 
interoperable products to the instructions of the standard.  
 
if a firm had a duty under the antitrust laws to release customers from their contractual 
obligations; it is anything but efficient for a firm to abandon its contractual rights at the 
behest of customers who are no longer happy with their bargain, even when consumers 
might be better off (at least in the short run) if they did so. Imposing that type of 
affirmative obligation on a monopolist—whether explicitly or by refusing to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of such refusals—would penalize the monopolist for 
refusing to surrender a lawfully obtained monopoly, a result courts have long 
foresworn.” State of Illinois v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469 (7th 
Cir. 1991). This doctrine is known as the “Colgate doctrine” because it was first 
established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 
(1919). Later the Colgate doctrine was qualified: the monopolist is not obliged to 
justify his/her refusal to deal “where there had been no prior dealing between the 
parties.” See Ian Eagles and Louise Longdin, Refusals to License Intellectual 
Property—Testing the Limits of Law and Economics, at 134 (Hart Publ., Oxford and 
Portland, 2011), commenting on Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. 
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
Id.; see also Verizon Commc’n., Inc. v. Law Officers of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). However, it should be noted that in Verizon, the Supreme Court did not give Verizon 
carte blanche to refuse facilitating access to other communication companies. The Supreme 
Court said that, the communication market being heavily regulated, Verizon could be obliged 
by the regulator to share its monopoly: 
It suffices for present purposes to note that the indispensable requirement for invoking 
the doctrine is the unavailability of access to the “essential facilities”; where access 
exists, the doctrine serves no purpose. Thus, it is said that “essential facility claims 
should . . . be denied where a state or federal agency has effective power to compel 
sharing and to regulate its scope and terms.” Respondent believes that the existence of 
sharing duties under the 1996 Act supports its case. We think the opposite: The 1996 
Act’s extensive provision for access makes it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine 
of forced access. To the extent respondent’s “essential facilities” argument is distinct 
from its general § 2 argument, we reject it.  
Verizon Commc’n., Inc., 540 U.S. at 411. In other words, access to Verizon’s lines was not 
exclusively in the hands of Verizon, but also in the hands of the regulators. Therefore, 
Verizon’s refusal could be circumvented. 
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However, when standards on interoperability require that 
manufacturers use the basic technology, and when that technology is 
covered by patent(s), there may be two different solutions: if 
manufacturers of interoperable products have also applied for patents 
(on the interoperable technology), and these patents cannot be used 
without the use of the first patent (i.e., those patent are dependent on 
the first patents), they may be entitled to a compulsory license  as 
well as obliged to grant a cross-license to the patent holder if the 
second invention is technically and economically significant.
46
 But if 
the manufacturers of interoperable products have not applied for 
patents and thus are not entitled to compulsory cross licenses under 
Article 31(l) of the TRIPS Agreement, courts may deem that the 
patent holder has no business justification to refuse a license for 
manufacturers who wish to make new products that are not 
substitutes of the patented products. This line of reasoning has been 
followed by the European Court of Justice.
47
 It is also found in the 
 
 46.  The mandatory availability of compulsory cross licenses for dependent patents is 
established by Article 31(l) of the TRIPS Agreement, as follows: 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third 
parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected: 
 (l) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent (‘the second 
patent’) which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent (‘the first 
patent’), the following additional conditions shall apply: 
  (i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important technical 
advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in 
the first patent; 
  (ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence [sic] on 
reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and 
  (iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except 
with the assignment of the second patent. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(l). 
 47.  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated this understanding in C-241/91 P and C-
242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commc’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-808, and confirmed it in Case C-
418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. Commc’n, 2004 E.C.R. I-5069. In IMS Health GmbH & 
Co., the court articulated: 
Therefore, the refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position to allow access to a 
product protected by an intellectual property right, where that product is indispensable 
for operating on a secondary market, may be regarded as abusive only where the 
undertaking which requested the licence [sic] does not intend to limit itself essentially 
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statutes of a few countries that impose compulsory licenses on 
patents when the patentees’ refusal to license may block the 
establishment of an industry.
48
 
These solutions, however, are not available in the United States, 
where Article 31(l) of the TRIPS Agreement has not been transposed 
to national law. Cross licensing, however, permits the first inventor to 
have access to improved technology, and the second inventor to use 
its technology. Therefore, cross licensing is indeed a common 
solution. The US Department of Justice and the FTC tend to view 
such deals with favor, to the extent that they avoid expensive 
litigation. When these deals are done between horizontal competitors, 
however, further analysis of the effects on the market is required.
49
 
Absent mandatory standardization, the essential facility doctrine 
does not apply to patents because of the alternativeness condition. In 
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co, the court defined the 
second element of the doctrine as “a competitor’s inability practically 
or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility.”
 50 Thus, patents do 
not meet the doctrine’s second element, because it cannot be logically 
met.
 
A district court in Massachusetts adopted this reasoning in Data 
 
to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the 
owner of the intellectual property right, but intends to produce new goods or services 
not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer 
demand. 
Id. ¶ 49. 
 48.  This is the case of the patent statutes of Australia, India, the United Kingdom, 
Argentina, and the Dominican Republic. See the WIPO study, REFUSALS TO LICENSE, supra 
note 45, at 10 and 14; see also infra note 64. 
 49.  In this sense, the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
Issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission says: 
Settlements involving the cross-licensing of intellectual property rights can be an 
efficient means to avoid litigation and, in general, courts favor such settlements. When 
such cross-licensing involves horizontal competitors, however, the Agencies will 
consider whether the effect of the settlement is to diminish competition among entities 
that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the 
absence of the cross-license. In the absence of offsetting efficiencies, such settlements 
may be challenged as unlawful restraints of trade. Cf. United States v. Singer 
Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (cross-license agreement was part of broader 
combination to exclude competitors). 
U.S. DOJ & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 28 (Apr. 6, 
1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
 50.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.
51
 Data General 
(DG) sold computer systems and provided services for their 
maintenance and repair. Grumman also provided services to maintain 
and repair several computer systems, including those manufactured 
by DG.
52 
DG brought an action for damages and injunctive relief 
against Grumman’s use of a diagnostic program (MV/ADEX) 
developed by DG.
53 
The program is used both to design DG’s 
computer systems and to repair systems in use.
54 
Grumman 
counterclaimed against DG, alleging, among other claims, a violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
55
 
Grumman argued that DG violated the Sherman Antitrust Act on 
the basis of turning the diagnostic program into an essential facility. 
Grumman’s reliance on the essential facility doctrine was grounded 
on the fact that DG only licensed the diagnostic tool to purchasers of 
DG computer systems in its Cooperative Maintenance Organization 
program (CMO program).
56 
Third-party maintainers (TPMs), such as 
Grumman, were denied access to the CMO program, except as 
required to maintain their personal DG computers.
57 
Consequently, 
DG refused to authorize Grumman to use its diagnostic program to 
provide maintenance services to third parties. In support of its 
argument, Grumman invoked two Supreme Court opinions dealing 
with the essential facility doctrine, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp.,
58 
and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States.
59
 Nevertheless, the court did not agree with Grumman’s 
allegation that the diagnostic program was an essential facility 
“which DG must share with its competitors.”
60 
“The [c]rux of 
 
 51.  Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp. (Data Gen. I), 761 F. Supp. 185 (D. 
Mass. 1991), aff’d, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). See also Gregory V.S. McCurdy, Intellectual 
Property and Competition: Does the Essential Facilities Doctrine Shed Any New Light, 25 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 472, 475–76 (2003). 
 52.  Data Gen. I, 761 F. Supp. at 187. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 189.  
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 59.  Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 60.  Data Gen. I, 761 F. Supp. at 191. 
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Grumman’s essential facility argument,” the court noted, “is that only 
the manufacturer of computer systems is capable of developing a 
diagnostic tool which is an essential device in the repair of those 
computers.”
61 
The court added: 
DG does not have monopoly power in the sale of computer 
systems and thus is not using a bottleneck to create another 
monopoly. The “bottleneck” of its superior knowledge in the 
design of DG computers is insufficient to invoke the essential 
facilities doctrine; a better mousetrap is not necessarily an 
essential facility. The Sherman Act has not been interpreted to 
require manufacturers to abandon their advantage in creating 
accessories to their systems. If manufacturers of complex and 
innovative systems were required to share with competitors the 
development of accessories, because they had a possibly 
absolute advantage through producing the system, the 
incentives of copyright and patent laws would be severely 
undermined. Not only would the manufacturer, who is in the 
best position to create these accessories, have less incentive to 
do so, but also the impetus for competitors to reverse engineer 
and produce competing solutions would be reduced.
62
 
However, the court’s assumption that one of the patent system’s 
goals is to lead competitors to produce competing solutions is only 
possible when one understands that competing solutions are always 
obtainable. For instance, a better mousetrap is not necessarily an 
essential facility because there is always a worse mousetrap to 
compete with it. Consumers may prefer to acquire the latter if the 
price or other commercial conditions are more appealing than the 
technical advance of the former. In other words, given that patents do 
not block, per definition, the possibility of competitors to find their 
own solutions or to use solutions available on the market (either 
patented by other inventors or in the public domain), there is a logical 
incongruence between patents and essential facilities. In the absence 
of government interference (imposing the mandatory use of a 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 192 (emphasis added).  
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patented technology), patented inventions are inherently subject to be 
alternated by competing inventions.  
However, it should be noted that under the statutes of some 
countries the solution would be different if a voluntary standard had 
been adopted by a large part of the industry—i.e., if it had become a 
de facto standard, as noted above.
63
 In that case, statutory provisions 
could apply that order a compulsory license of patents where the 
refusal to license may block the establishment or the operation of the 
whole industry.
64
 
The existence of different approaches to the problems caused by 
refusals to license VSEPs to the establishment of commercial or 
productive activities means that the solution may be dependent on the 
maturity of the industry using the standard. Initially, courts might not 
see the exercise of exclusive patent rights as an unlawful restraint. 
But once the industry is set and thriving, and the products 
disseminated, the patent could be seen as an inconvenient obstacle. 
Compulsory licenses might then ensue. However, in other countries 
where enforceable VSEP rights may be deemed to hinder the 
 
 63.  See supra note 18. 
 64.  For example, the Australian Patents Act 1990, consolidated as of January 1, 2011, 
provides that compulsory licenses may be granted when “the reasonable requirements of the 
public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied.” Patents Act 1990 s 
133(2)(ii) (Austl.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8233. Section 
135 provides that  
(1) For the purposes of sections 133 and 134, the reasonable requirements of the public 
with respect to a patented invention are to be taken not to have been satisfied if: (a) an 
existing trade or industry in Australia, or the establishment of a new trade or industry 
in Australia, is unfairly prejudiced, or the demand in Australia for the patented 
product, or for a product resulting from the patented process, is not reasonably met, 
because of the patentee’s failure: . . . (iv) to grant licences [sic] on reasonable terms 
. . . 
Id. § 135(1)(a)(iv). The United Kingdom Patents Act 1977, as revised in 1999, has a very 
similar provision. See Patents Act, 1999, c. 37, § 48A.1(a)(ii) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=1623. Article 42 of the Industrial Property Act 
of the Dominican Republic provides for compulsory licenses as remedies for anti-competitive 
uses of patent rights: “For the purposes of this law, the following practices, among others, are 
considered to be anti-competitive: . . . (c) Hindrance of commercial or productive activities.” 
Industrial Property Act, art. 42 (Law 20-00) (2000) (Dom. Rep.). Article 44(c) of the Patent 
Law of Argentina, of 1996, and Article 42(c) of the Industrial Property Act of the Dominican 
Republic, of 2000, qualify the hindrance (as a result of the refusal to license a patent) of 
commercial or productive activities as an anticompetitive act and sanction it with a compulsory 
license. See REFUSALS TO LICENSE, supra note 45. 
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establishment of a new industry, compulsory licenses may be granted 
even during the infancy of that industry. The distinction between new 
activities and established ones for the purposes of compulsory 
licenses is clearly established in both the Australian and the United 
Kingdom statutes (compulsory licenses can be granted in both cases), 
but not in the statutes of the Dominican Republic and Argentina, 
where eventually a defense might be raised against the granting of 
compulsory licenses that block a new industry—after all, patents are 
about new technologies and it is expected that they produce an 
impact in blocking the establishment by competitors in the new fields 
of business the patents eventually cover.
65
 
The brief description of this Section of the various approaches to 
the exercise of patent rights in the context of standards, in particular 
of those patents whose exploitation is necessary to the operation of 
the standards, shows that there are several common points in different 
jurisdictions, namely the similarities in the treatment of patent rights 
under voluntary and mandatory standards, and the adoption of 
FRANDS in the first case. However, there is no total consistency. 
Discussions aiming at obtaining some consistency have emerged in 
multilateral organizations, such as the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU)
66
 and the World Trade 
Organization Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),
67
 but 
the fact is that we are very far from harmonizing the various 
approaches described. This may constitute a problem, particularly if 
we consider that the adoption of international standards is on the rise, 
especially in the context of technologies that need to be adapted to a 
globalized economy.  
 
 65.  See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 66.  See, e.g., Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, which the ITU defines 
as “a ‘code of practice’ regarding patents covering, in varying degrees, the subject matters of 
ITU T Recommendations, ITU-R Recommendations, ISO deliverables and IEC deliverables 
. . . .” Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/ 
Pages/policy.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 67.  See Technical barriers to trade, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/ 
tbt_e.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (describing the work of the TBT Committee and the 
relevant documents). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 47:61 
 
 
III. COPYRIGHT AND STANDARDS 
The interaction of copyrights with technical standards has been 
discussed in two different scenarios. The first scenario is the 
impossibility (or possibility) of recognizing copyrights in technical 
standards given the inexistence (or existence) of originality and 
creativity.
68
 The second scenario is related to the acquisition and 
enforcement of copyrights: the exclusivity they generate would create 
a problem of dissemination of the texts containing standards, and 
therefore would directly conflict
69
 with public policies favoring 
unencumbered access to them.
70
 
Technical standards are a blend of literary and scientific works, 
insofar as they are conveyed by means of written and numerical 
language. However, their eligibility for copyright protection has been 
challenged on the grounds of lack of originality. The argument is 
that, when confronted by the scènes à faire doctrine as well as the 
merger doctrine,
71
 the dichotomy idea/expression disappears and the 
 
 68.  See, e.g., the decision of the Brazilian Federal Court quoted in note 72, infra. 
 69.  See e.g., the decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of São Paulo. Infra note 89. 
This argument applies to all standards, both mandatory and voluntary. But this generalization is 
mistaken. As explained next, mandatory standards are “laws” for all purposes, and therefore 
they are inherently non-copyrightable. See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Cong. Int’l, Inc. (Veeck II), 
293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), which will be discussed see infra note 108 and 
accompanying text. But the same is not true as far as voluntary standards are concerned.  
 70.  Samuelson, supra note 2, raises a mix of arguments against the copyrightability of 
standards, because they would not fit under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (which lists 
copyrightable works). However, the commentator, in spite of naming her article Questioning 
Copyrights in Standards, narrows her analysis down to standardized codes. That is why the 
article’s first conclusion is that “To sum up, industry standard codes promulgated by 
organizations such as the AMA and ADA may be unprotectable systems under § 102(b). Such 
codes and other systematic organizations of information are certainly uncopyrightable if they 
are dictated by rules or functionality.” Id. at 214–15. However, technical standards are not just 
codes. Most standards are descriptive texts, and they do not necessarily contain numbers—even 
if they do so frequently. For example, an apparel franchisor guide on how franchisees shall 
arrange their shop windows probably will not contain numbers (other than, eventually, the 
minimum area required for the window), and yet it is no less a standard than Qualcomm’s 
CDMA [code division multiple access] standards. 
 71.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted: 
Numerous doctrines separate protectable expression from elements of the public 
domain. For example, the doctrine of “scènes-à-faire” teaches that elements of a work 
that are “indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic”—like 
cowboys, bank robbers, and shootouts in stories of the American West—get no 
protection. Similarly, the “merger doctrine” instructs that some ideas can only be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Technical Standards, Intellectual Property, and Competition 89 
 
 
formulation of standards becomes inevitable, with no room for 
arbitrariness.
72
 Thus, technical standards by their nature would be 
unable to demonstrate originality and creativity, compliance with 
which is a condition for protection by copyright.
73
  
An additional argument against copyrights in standards is that 
their ubiquity and the resulting inconvenience of recognizing 
copyright protection in them may be compared to the genericism of 
 
expressed in a limited number of ways—single words or colors for example. When 
expression is so limited, idea and expression “merge.” Expressions merged with ideas 
cannot be protected, lest one author own the idea itself. 
Zalewski, Draftics, Ltd. v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 111 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations 
omitted). 
 72.  See Samuelson, supra note 2. This same understanding was expressed by a Brazilian 
federal court (the Fifth Chamber of the Federal Regional Court of the 3rd Region) which 
analyzed the copyrightability of technical standards elaborated by a Brazilian SSO, the 
Brazilian Association of Technical Standards (ABNT)), as follows: 
Strictly speaking [in the elaboration of technical standards] there is no creation of the 
mind, intellectual manifestation of individuality; participants are bound to capture 
technical information already propagated with sufficient stability to substantiate a 
guide on the adequacy of inputs, products or services. . . . 
The attributes of creativity, originality are not present, because the systematization 
contemplates only rooted technological data, built during the development of the 
economy and possibly achieved by patents or industrial designs. 
TRF-5, App. Civ. No. 00100-71-65.2006.4.03.6100/SP, Relator: Des. Antonio Cedenho, 
14.3.2014, DIÁRIO DA JUSTICA [D.J.], 02.04.2014 (Braz.) (citations omitted). 
 73.  Unlike patent statutes, which invariably explain the substantive conditions that 
inventions must meet in order to become patentable, copyright statutes generally do not go 
beyond listing the sort of works that deserve copyright protection and cite those works that do 
not. Some statutes refer to copyrightable works as “original works” or “creations of the mind,” 
thereby implying the condition of originality. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011); Revised Law 
on Intellectual Property, regularizing, clarifying and harmonizing the Applicable Statutory 
Provisions art. 10, 12 (1996) (Spain), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details. 
jsp?id=1358; Lei No. 9.610, de 19 de Fevereiro de 1998, [Law No. 9610, of Feb. 19, 1998] 
(Braz.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=514; Copyright Act 1968 
§ 31 (Austl.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=14953. But other 
statutes do not even mention the term “original,” the condition of originality/creativity being 
assumed as subjacent to “literary, artistic and scientific works.” See, e.g., Copyright Act, B.E. 
2537, art. 6 (1994) (Thai.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3801. 
The Egyptian Intellectual Property Act of 2002, however, is an exception and, like patent 
statutes, defines “creation” as “The creative nature that confers originality on the work (Article 
138(2).” Law No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights), 2 June 
2002, art. 138.2 (Egypt), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=1301. 
Either by statutory language, explicit or implied, or by judicial interpretation, works must be 
creative or original (the distinction between these two terms being highly ambiguous and very 
frequently non-existent), in order to be copyrightable. 
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certain trademarks, i.e., those trademarks whose use is so widespread 
that they are taken as synonymous with the common name of the 
product, sometimes to the point they are incorporated into the lexicon 
(for example, “cellophane” or “band aid”).74 In other words, as the 
argument goes, standards are so frequently and necessarily used that 
they should not be subject to individual appropriation. 
However, the suggestion that, by analogy with trademark law, the 
widespread use of a standard would lead to the loss of copyright can 
only be explained by a deep disregard for the fundamental notions of 
trademark law. Trademark genericism is not only caused by the 
widespread use of a mark. Genericism may also be caused by the 
negligence of the owner to educate consumers about the true nature 
of the mark as a proprietary asset. US doctrine and European 
legislation on this matter are clear: genericism only sanctions inert 
and negligent trademark holders, or those who, albeit diligent, are 
unable to keep consumers educated as to the distinctive nature of the 
mark not those who diligently induce consumers to equate the mark 
with the product they sell.
75
 
However, despite the technical nature of their contents, technical 
standards still reveal or result from creativity. Creativity exists where 
the creator—individual or collective—can make choices to achieve 
the same result. This fundamental characteristic of intellectual 
property has been designated in the patent context as the principle of 
alternativeness.
76
 This theme was scrutinized by the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental 
Plans Ass’n, a case involving a copyright claim about a standardized 
 
 74.  See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.3.2.1, 2.41 (2014); see also 
Samuelson, supra note 2, at 219. 
 75.  For an introduction to genericism in US law, see J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., 
MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 262–63 (3d ed. 2004) (entry 
on “genericide”), and CHARLES R. MCMANIS, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN A NUTSHELL, 142-
44 (3d ed. 1993). For EU law, see Article 12(2)(a) of the First Council Directive of December 
21, 1988, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (89/104/EEC). 
Marks, First Council Directive 21/12/1988, No. 89/104. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, art. 12(2)(a) (EU), available 
at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=1418. 
 76.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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dental procedures code and respective nomenclature.
77
 The American 
Dental Association (ADA) produced a taxonomy that codified dental 
knowledge and technology. Dental procedures were classified into 
groups, and a number, followed by a brief and a longer description, 
designated each procedure. For example, the procedure of guided 
tissue regeneration, per site, per tooth, including the removal of the 
membrane, was assigned number 04267.
78
 In holding that this kind of 
taxonomy is protectable by copyright, the court said: 
Any original literary work may be copyrighted. The necessary 
degree of “originality” is low, and the work need not be 
aesthetically pleasing to be “literary.”  
So too with a taxonomy—of butterflies, legal citations, or 
dental procedures. Facts do not supply their own principles of 
organization. Classification is a creative endeavor. Butterflies 
may be grouped by their color, or the shape of their wings, or 
their feeding or breeding habits, or their habitats, or the 
attributes of their caterpillars, or the sequence of their DNA; 
each scheme of classification could be expressed in multiple 
ways. Dental procedures could be classified by complexity, or 
by the tools necessary to perform them, or by the parts of the 
mouth involved, or by the anesthesia employed, or in any of a 
dozen different ways. The Code’s descriptions don't “merge 
with the facts” any more than a scientific description of 
butterfly attributes is part of a butterfly.
79
 
The fundamental issue presented by the case was compliance with the 
condition of alternativeness.
80
 In fact, the ADA had alternative 
classifications at its disposal, and other stakeholders could classify 
dental procedures without the need for copying or plagiarizing the 
 
 77.  Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 78.  Am. Dental Ass’n, 126 F.3d at 977. 
 79.  Id. at 979.  
 80.  “Classification”, the court said, “is a creative endeavor. Butterflies may be grouped 
by their color, or the shape of their wings, or their feeding or breeding habits, or their habitats, 
or the attributes of their caterpillars, or the sequence of their DNA; each scheme of 
classification could be expressed in multiple ways.” Id. Alternativeness, as explained in note 4, 
supra, resides in the multiple ways of expressing an idea (or, for that matter, as far as patents 
are concerned, in the multiplicity of ideas that reach the same practical result). 
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ADA’s code.81 Technical standards refer to production methods, but 
there are many different ways to write standards. The procedural 
stages of each standard can be organized differently, and its 
presentation does not have to follow a single format. SSOs have 
alternatives at their disposal to elaborate technical standards. There is 
creativity in the choices made, however modest those choices may 
be. That alternativeness makes technical standards eligible for 
copyright protection. 
Moreover, as noted, technical standards are the expression of 
organized phases of production of goods and services. They should 
be presented and drafted so as to be well and easily understood by 
users. Consequently, there must be creative merit in the development 
of standards, to the extent that their degree of clarity and the way 
their instructions are organized influence the outcome. Standards are 
not a simple listing of facts, such as a phone book or a list of 
customers of a company. An SSO’s bad choices in elaborating 
standards often lead to incomprehensible or confusing standards with 
 
 81.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was emphatic about and exhaustive on 
this point: 
Number 04267 reads “guided tissue regeneration—nonresorbable barrier, per site, per 
tooth” but could have read “regeneration of tissue, guided by nonresorbable barrier, 
one site and tooth per entry”. Or “use of barrier to guide regeneration of tissue, without 
regard to the number of sites per tooth and whether or not the barrier is resorbable”. 
The first variation is linguistic, the second substantive; in each case the decision to use 
the actual description is original to the ADA, not knuckling under to an order imposed 
on language by some “fact” about dental procedures. Blood is shed in the ADA’s 
committees about which description is preferable. The number assigned to any one of 
the three descriptions could have had four or six digits rather than five; guided tissue 
regeneration could have been placed in the 2500 series rather than the 4200 series; 
again any of these choices is original to the author of a taxonomy, and another author 
could do things differently. Every number in the ADA’s Code begins with zero, 
assuring a large supply of unused numbers for procedures to be devised or reclassified 
in the future; an author could have elected instead to leave wide gaps inside the 
sequence. A catalog that initially assigns 04266, 04267, 04268 to three procedures will 
over time depart substantively from one that initially assigns 42660, 42670, and 42680 
to the same three procedures. So all three elements of the Code—numbers, short 
descriptions, and long descriptions, are copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a). The Maroon Book and the Bluebook offer different taxonomies of legal 
citations; Wotquenne and Helm devised distinct catalogs of C.P.E. Bach’s oeuvre; 
Delta Dental Association could have written its own classification of dental 
procedures. 
Id. 
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which it is difficult to comply; conversely, good choices generate 
effective and efficient standards.
82
 
If one could admit the validity of the understanding of the 
Brazilian Federal Court, which held that in technical standards “there 
is no creation of the mind, intellectual manifestation of 
individuality,”83 then no textbook, thesaurus, or dictionary—i.e., no 
work that does not contain new information, inaccessible before 
publication—could be deemed creative. According to the Brazilian 
Federal Court, because data collection is not a creative activity, the 
standards that may result therefrom are not creative either.
84
 But this 
interpretation confuses the expression and the idea. This confusion is 
confirmed by the court’s holding that the technical standards at bar 
corresponded to “scientific content.”85 Technical data may not be 
protected in and of themselves.
86
 But copyright does not protect that 
sort of data. Copyright focuses on the expression of ideas. In 
rejecting copyright protection of technical standards the Brazilian 
court suggested that copyright enforcement would impose exclusivity 
on technical content.
87
 However, this reasoning is false. When SSOs 
assert copyrights, they seek to protect documents that memorialize a 
single representation of technical standards for reproduction and 
dissemination throughout the industry, not protection for the actual 
techniques described by the documents.
88
 
 
 82.  On the advantages of well written standards see, e.g., U.S. EPA, EPA QA/G-6, 
Guidance for Preparing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 2 (Apr., 2007), available at 
www.epa.gov/quality/qs-docs/g6-final.pdf (“Writing Styles”). 
 83.  See supra note 72. 
 84.  The court’s view, is worth of being repeated (in part): “The attributes of creativity, 
originality are not present, because systematization only contemplates rooted technological data 
. . . .” App. Civ. No. 00100-71-65.2006.4.03.6100/SP, Relator: Des. Cedenho, 14.3.2014 
(Braz.). 
 85.  Id. The court held, “ABNT could at most claim the protection of compilations 
[citation of the Brazilian statute omitted]. As regards their scientific content, technical standards 
are invulnerable [sic].” Id. at 7. In using the word “invulnerable,” an odd word in this context, 
the court perhaps wanted to refer to the ineligibility of copyright protection for standards’ 
scientific content. 
 86.  But technical data may also be protected, as the court itself acknowledged when it 
mentioned patents and industrial designs. Id. 
 87.  In this sense, the court held that “Therefore, the use of technical standards may not be 
refused to economic agents who engage in industrial manufacture and commercialization.” Id. 
 88.  It is in this context that the TBT Agreement’s definition of technical regulations and 
of standards refers to “documents.” The term “documents” refers to the written expression of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 47:61 
 
 
To illustrate this, suppose that an employee of an SSO collects a 
series of technical recommendations and instructions agreed upon by 
the various working groups to elaborate a standard for the evaluation 
and accounting of patent portfolios. Suppose that that employee, a 
consummate poet, writes the standard in verse. And suppose that 
those responsible for making decisions in the SSO, thrilled by the 
employee’s inspiration and convinced of the clarity and 
appropriateness of the poem, approve the standard. Would courts 
hold that such a technical standard would not be eligible for 
copyright protection because it was about scientific content and thus 
lacked creativity? 
As said above, a second argument has been invoked to deny 
copyright protection to the written expression of technical standards. 
This argument is that technical standards, because they impose 
patterns of conduct, amount to norms of social behavior and, 
therefore, are equivalent to statutory rules.
89
 Technical standards 
would thus consist of normative procedures. The vast majority of the 
Contracting Parties to the Berne Convention, exclude such norms 
from copyright protection.
90
 Some countries have included such an 
exclusion in their statutes, including Bahrain (Act 22 of 2006, 
ArticleArticle 4(b)), Belgium (Law on Copyright of 1994, Article 
8(2), Brazil (Law 9.610, of 1998, ArticleArticle 8(IV), Slovenia 
(Copyright and Related Rights Act of 1995, as last amended in 2006, 
Article 9(1)(2), and Switzerland (Federal Act of 1992, Article 5(a))—
 
standardized technical instructions. 
 89.  In Target Engenharia v. ABNT, Ap. Civ. No. 9220380-29.2008.8.26.000, Relator: 
Coelho Mendes, 11.3.2014 (Braz.), available at http://www.migalhas.com.br/arquivos/2014/3/ 
art20140313-04.pdf, the Court of Justice of the State of São Paulo held that: 
[I]t seems evident that the activity of coordination and supervision of the process of 
elaborating technical standards does not have the private nature sustained by the 
plaintiff. On the contrary, the purpose of the elaboration of a group of norms that 
manage life in society as a manifestly public purpose, given that it targets the 
organized and specific regulation of the commercial, technical, scientific and 
environment system in our country. 
Id. at 5.  
 90.  Article 2(4) of the Berne Convention provides: “It shall be a matter for legislation in 
the countries of the Union to determine the protection to be granted to official texts of a 
legislative, administrative and legal nature, and to official translations of such texts.” Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 2(4), Sept. 9, 1886, last 
revised on July 24, 971, last amended on Sept. 28, 1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698. 
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just to name a few. Other countries have set that exclusion by court 
decisions, such as the United States.
91
 The rationale for such 
exclusion is simple. In view of the universal principle that no one 
may be obliged to anything but the law,
92
 it is necessary in 
democratic societies that citizens be able to access a codification of 
such obligations to comply with them. If statutes and other 
mandatory enactments were protected by copyright, citizens would 
need to pay to access the law. This would deny the poor the 
possibility of knowing the law and would conflict with the public 
policy of making the law as much accessible and well known as 
possible. 
In an opinion already discussed, the Court of Justice of the State 
of São Paulo, in Target Engenharia v. ABNT, refused copyright 
protection to technical standards on the ground that, because they 
embody normative procedures, they are excluded from copyright 
protection by the statutory provision that excludes “the texts of 
treaties or conventions, laws, decrees, regulations, judicial decisions 
and other official acts.”93 The court said: 
In this context, in view of the exegesis of the aforesaid law, it 
is easy to realize that the technical standards supervised by the 
plaintiff [ABNT] fall within the exclusion from copyright 
protection, either because they consist of normative procedures 
found by the methodology of studies focused on the interests 
of society; or because they are promoted to the category of 
 
 91.  “Excluding ‘the law’ from the purview of the copyright statutes dates back to this 
nation’s earliest period. In 1834, the Supreme Court interpreted the first federal copyright laws 
and unanimously held that ‘no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions 
delivered by this Court . . .’ Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668, 8 L. Ed. 1055 
(1834).” Veeck v. S. Bldg. Cong. Int’l, Inc. (Veeck II), 293 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc). 
 92.  This principle buttresses every democratic regime and is explicitly stated in many 
national constitutions, such as Canada’s, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, § 1 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8656, and Brazil’s, CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL 
[C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, pt. 2, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details. 
jsp?id=8755. 
 93.  Target Engenharia, Ap. Civ. No. 9220380-29.2008.8.26.000, Relator: Mendes, 
11.3.2014 (Braz.). See supra note 88. For the statutory provision in question, see Lei No. 9610 
[Law No. 9610], supra note 76. 
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official acts, to the extent compliance with them is required by 
legislation in force.
94
 
The idea that technical standards are normative procedures results 
from a misunderstanding of their true nature. When an SSO claims 
copyright in technical standards, it does not claim exclusivity in the 
processes or products used in the processes incorporated into the 
standards, but in their enunciation. Exclusivity in the underlying 
processes or products may be a matter of patents, utility models, 
designs, or plant varieties. But those processes or products should not 
be confused with their enunciation. To give an example, technical 
standards are in relation to the technical instructions they contain in 
the same position as the set of specifications of patents vis-à-vis the 
claimed inventions. Patent specifications are literary expressions; the 
inventions they describe are the ideas. Patent rights concern the latter, 
and, due to the public policy of facilitating the dissemination of 
inventions (for the sake of promoting “the progress of science and 
useful arts,” as Section 8 of the US Constitution says), patent 
specifications are not copyrightable. One could see here a good 
argument in favor of the refusal to grant copyright protection to 
technical standards, but there is a major difference between patents 
and standards: whereas patent law has been built on the necessity of
 
 94.  Target Engenharia, Ap. Civ. No. 9220380-29.2008.8.26.000, Relator: Mendes, 
11.3.2014 (Braz.). The court refers to Article 39(VIII) of the Brazilian Code of Consumer 
Protection: 
It is unlawful for the supplier of products or services, among other abusive practices: . 
. . . 
[T]o place on consumer’s market any product or service that is not in conformity with 
the standards issued by the competent official agencies or, in the absence of specific 
standards, by the Brazilian Association of Technical Standards or other entity credited 
by the National Council for Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality 
(Conmetro). 
Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, [Law No. 8078, of Sept. 11, 1990], art. 39(VII) 
(Braz.), available at http://www.procon.sp.gov.br/texto.asp?id=745. The court, however, 
misread that provision, because it did not designate as consumer fraud the breach of any 
standards elaborated by ABNT, but only those that special statutes made mandatory. Id. at 6. A 
different understanding would lead to the absurd conclusion that every standard elaborated and 
approved by ABNT—a private SSO—would be automatically transformed into mandatory rules 
without the need for the intervention of Brazilian official regulatory agencies.  
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fostering invention and promoting technological dissemination,
95
 
voluntary or consensual standards pursue the business interests of the 
industry, and there is no such supporting public policy. At most, the 
argument could serve—and does serve—to explain why mandatory 
standards are not copyrightable, but that is all. 
However, if voluntary standards could be seen as norms of social 
conduct, as the Brazilian court did, all SSOs should be dissolved 
immediately on behalf of the fundamental interests of free societies, 
namely the values of freedom of initiative and freedom of 
competition.
96
 Indeed, if manufacturers, merchants, and service 
providers were required to comply with all the thousands of standards 
developed by private SSOs, the freedom to create, invent, and 
introduce new products and services in world markets would be 
seriously compromised. The legislative, educational, and pedagogical 
work of SSOs—essential for improving not only the quality of life of 
citizens all over the world, but also the competitiveness of the 
services and products of companies—would become a prison and an 
obstacle to technical progress. Technical and social progress is the 
immediate and direct consequence of the introduction of inventions 
and improvements.
97
 Societies would regress to the regime of the 
Middle Age craftsmen corporations, whose regulations, under the 
pretext of ensuring quality, imposed stringent technical precepts on 
 
 95.  See, in this regard, Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology . . . . 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 7. 
 96.  Free competition is a mainstay of democratic societies, as Friedrich Hayek has 
explained: “It is only because the control of the means of production is divided among many 
people acting independently that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves.” 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 41(1944), (published in a condensed version as 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, in READER’S DIGEST (Apr. 1945), available at 
mises.org/sites/default/files/Road%20to%20serfdom.pdf). 
 97.  In a groundbreaking book, Robert Friedel has persuasively shown the linkage 
between invention and technical and social progress, even if this progress is not always linear, 
given the inherently cultural dimension of technology. As he concluded: “Technology and the 
pursuit of improvement are ultimate expressions of freedom, of the capacity of humans to reject 
the limitations of their past and their experience, to transcend the boundaries of their biological 
capacities and their social traditions.” ROBERT FRIEDEL, A CULTURE OF IMPROVEMENT—
TECHNOLOGY AND THE WESTERN MILLENIUM 543 (2007). 
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masters and apprentices under severe penalties, including exposure in 
the pillory.
98
 
Under current law, the literary expressions of mandatory words 
are not copyrightable subject matter. By contrast, expressions of 
voluntary standards are copyrightable. This affirmation results from 
the language of paragraph J of the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (Agreement on TBT), which is part of the Code of Good 
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards: 
The notification shall contain the name and address of the 
standardizing body, the name and issue of the publication in 
which the work programme is published, the period to which 
the work programme applies, its price (if any), and how and 
where it can be obtained. The notification may be sent directly 
to the ISO/IEC Information Centre, or, preferably, through the 
relevant national member or international affiliate of ISONET, 
as appropriate.
99
 (emphasis added) 
This provision seems to deal with the formality of notifications, but it 
contains significant language (emphasized) that gives it a 
significantly substantive meaning. The WTO defines standards to 
mean voluntary standards.
100
 The TBT language concerns 
transparency and defines the setting of standards by national SSOs 
towards other WTO Members. According to the Agreement on TBT, 
WTO Members must notify the WTO Secretariat on a regular basis 
of the standards they are elaborating.
101
 This provision seems to aim 
at avoiding surprises and give other Members’ exporters time to 
prepare for the new requirements. The notification must include 
 
 98.  For a detailed description of the organization of production in medieval Europe under 
the guilds regime, see E. LEVASSEUR, HISTROIRE DES CLASSES OUVRIERES ET DE L’INDUSTRIE 
EN FRANCE AVANT 1789, vol. II (Arthur Rousseau ed., 2d ed., 1901). On the role that the guilds 
regime played on the creation and use of protopatents and trademarks. See also Pires de 
Carvalho, supra note 6, at 164–75, 536–61. The term “protopatents” refers to patent-like titles 
that preceded modern patents, whose beginning can be traced back to the 1624 Statute of 
Monopolies and its judicial construction in the eighteenth century. The term was created by 
Hansjoerg Pohlmann, Hansjoerg Pohlmann, The Inventor’s Rights in Early German Law—
Materials of the Time from 1531 to 1700 43 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 121 (F. D. Prager, trans., 1961). 
 99.  Agreement on TBT, supra note 1, at Annex 3, ¶ J, subpar. 3. 
 100.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 101.  Agreement on TBT, supra note 1, at Annex 3, ¶ J, subpar. 3. 
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information about the price at which the standards will be sold.
102
 
The provision embodies two distinct ideas. First, the idea that the 
texts of standards should be freely available is put aside. Second, 
WTO Members are expected to set a price, which may cover not only 
the costs of transmitting the texts but also the added value that stems 
from copyright protection. This extra charge is allowed by Paragraph 
M, which reads: 
On the request of any interested party within the territory of a 
Member of the WTO, the standardizing body shall promptly 
provide, or arrange to provide, a copy of a draft standard which 
it has submitted for comments. Any fees charged for this 
service shall, apart from the real cost of delivery, be the same 
for foreign and domestic parties.
103
 
This topic was addressed in depth by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress 
International, Inc.
104
 The case concerned a dispute involving 
copyright infringement by a non-profit website administered by 
Veeck. The website published building codes adopted by the 
municipalities of Anna and Savoy, Texas, United States.
105
 Those 
codes were developed by the Southern Building Code Congress 
International Inc. (SBCCI) and were part of a collection of building 
codes dealing with various topics, such as plumbing, gas, and fire 
prevention.
106
 Veeck alleged there was no copyright infringement 
because the codes lost any copyright protection when the two 
municipalities adopted the codes and made them mandatory 
standards; having become legal rules, the public was entitled to free 
access.
107
 In the court’s first decision, Veeck I, three of four judges
 
 102.  Agreement on TBT, supra note 1, at Annex 3, ¶ J. 
 103.  Agreement on TBT, supra note 1, ¶ M.  
 104.  Veeck v. S. Bldg. Cong. Int’l, Inc (Veeck I), 241 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 105.  Id. at 401. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 403. 
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did not agree with this argument. In a subsequent rehearing en banc, 
in Veeck II, the court reversed the initial decision: 
The issue in this en banc case is the extent to which a private 
organization may assert copyright protection for its model 
codes, after the models have been adopted by a legislative 
body and become “the law”. Specifically, may a code-writing 
organization prevent a website operator from posting the text 
of a model code where the code is identified simply as the 
building code of a city that enacted the model code as law? 
Our short answer is that as law, the model codes enter the 
public domain and are not subject to the copyright holder’s 
exclusive prerogatives. As model codes, however, the 
organization’s works retain their protected status.108 . . . 
We emphasize that in continuing to write and publish model 
building codes, SBCCI is creating copyrightable works of 
authorship. When those codes are enacted into law, however, 
they become to that extent “the law” of the governmental 
entities and may be reproduced or distributed as “the law” of 
those jurisdictions.
109
 
Nothing should stand between a private SSO and the exercise of 
intellectual property rights in voluntary standards. However, an act of 
a government entity can convert a privately-set standard into a rule of 
mandatory obedience—in effect, a law. But a government agency can 
only transform a private work into a public norm through indirect 
expropriate of the work, which eliminates the work’s value as a 
private work but generates a right to fair compensation.
110
  
 
 108.  Veeck v. S. Bldg. Cong. Int’l, Inc. (Veeck II), 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc). Five judges dissented on the ground that, absent a statute or a decision by the Supreme 
Court, the creator of a literary work is always entitled to copyright protection. Id. at 808. 
 109.  Id. at 802. 
 110.  The TRIPS Agreement also suggests that intellectual property rights, acknowledged 
by WTO Members to be private rights, see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, Preamble, ¶ 4, 
must be protected against confiscation, i.e., any taking must be compensated. Only exceptions 
that do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holders are admitted. See 
id. art. 13, 26.2, 30. When the rights of intellectual proptery holders are taken, the holders must 
be compensated. See id. art. 31(h). 
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The obligation to pay compensation for the expropriation would 
only disappear in two situations: either a private SSO developed the 
technical standard per request of the official entity;
111
 or, once the 
standard was elaborated, the SSO encouraged its adoption as a 
mandatory standard by the official entity. In the first case, the 
standard would have been elaborated under a “work for hire” 
contract, and the SSO would be incentivized to pursue payment given 
that it would not be able to charge for the reproduction of the 
standard because of its mandatory nature.
 112
 In the second case, an 
implicit waiver of rights (and the consequent estoppel) would occur, 
given that, by encouraging the adoption of one of its standards by a 
governmental agency, the SSO would know (or should know) that 
such an adoption would transform the standard in a “law” and it 
would therefore prevent it from collecting fees on its reproduction. 
 
 111.  It should be noted, however, that copyright in standards does not depend on the 
private or public nature of the SSOs, but on the voluntary or mandatory nature of the standards 
themselves. Public entities may own copyrights. See Cnty. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate 
Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 179, 193 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 112.  In this case, the standard will be treated as work for hire, under 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2000) and 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1978), unless the SSO and the governmental entity have agreed 
otherwise. Since the Second Circuit’s opinion in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill 
Publishing Corp, 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966), the applicability of the work of hire regime to 
works made by independent contractors has been a settled matter. See Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 
568 (“We see no sound reason why these same principles are not applicable when the parties 
bear the relationship of employer and independent contractor”). In the case of works for hire, 
the copyright incentive is not needed—at least from the author’s perspective. Based on this 
rationale, it has been held that judges are not entitled to copyright in their opinions, because 
they are paid for elaborating them. They do not need the incentive of copyright to judge cases. 
See Cnty. of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 193–94: 
First American argues that the tax maps are sufficiently analogous to statutes and 
judicial opinions, which courts have found may not be copyrighted because they are in 
the public domain since their inception. The determination that no one may own a 
copyright in statutes and opinions arises not from a specific provision of the Copyright 
Act, but from a “judicial gloss” on the Act. In Banks [Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 
244 (1888)], for example, the Supreme Court held that as a matter of public policy 
judges may not own a copyright in the fruits of their judicial labor. . . . Because judges 
“receive from the public treasury a stated annual salary . . . and can themselves have 
no pecuniary interest or proprietorship, as against the public at large,” they cannot own 
a copyright. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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This second figure—the implicit waiver—was acknowledged by the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Veeck II opinion: 
Section 201(e) of the [Copyright] Act reflects Congress’s 
intention to protect copyrights from involuntary appropriation 
by government entities. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e).
 
This is not, 
however, a “takings” case, not least because SBCCI urged 
localities to adopt its model codes. The issue in the case is not 
the voluntariness of the appropriation but the legal 
consequences flowing from the permission that SBCCI gave.
113
 
What is important now is to emphasize that copyrightability of 
standards depends not only on the existence of alternative ways of 
elaborating them, but also on their mandatory or voluntary nature. 
The vast majority of standards elaborated by SSOs are copyrightable 
because they have no coercive force. Companies that follow them do 
so on a voluntary basis. Overall, consumers believe that compliance 
with certain standards ensures quality and, therefore, standard 
compliance may be a good marketing policy by manufacturers and 
service providers.
114
 But, under the value of economic freedom, 
entrepreneurs are free not to follow those private standards or 
terminate compliance when they see fit. 
One theme usually invoked in arguments against the copyright of 
technical standards is the barrier that copyright allegedly generates 
against their dissemination.
115
 The opinion of a Brazilian state court 
 
 113.  Veeck II, 293 F.3d at 803; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(e): 
When an individual author’s ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights 
under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual 
author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization 
purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect 
to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect 
under this title, except as provided under title 11. 
Id. Title 11 of the United States Code deals with bankruptcy. See generally, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1532 (2013) (bankruptcy). 
 114.  Compliance with standards helps raise the confidence of consumers and contributes 
to better informed consumption choices. See International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 
Introduction to Standards 14–15 (2007) (Presentation), available at http://www.iec.ch/about/ 
globalreach/academia/pps/lect2007_1.pps (explaining why consumer organizations have an 
interest in participating in the elaboration of standards). 
 115.  Particularly in the information technology (IT) sector, there is a movement against 
proprietary standards and in favor of “open standards,” which would be free for public 
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of appeals for São Paulo in Target Engenharia v. ABNT was sensitive 
to this argument: 
However, it seems evident that the activity of coordinating and 
supervising the preparation of technical standards process does 
not have the private characteristics alleged by the plaintiff. 
Rather, the purpose of preparing a group of norms that manage 
life in society has a manifestly public objective, since it aims at 
setting the organized and specific regulation of the 
entrepreneurial, technical, scientific and environmental system 
in our country.
116
 
There is some confusion in this statement, since the standards 
elaborated by ABNT, the Brazilian SSO, are not “norms that manage 
life in society.”117 If adopted by companies, the standards are nothing 
more than norms that manage processes of manufacturing products 
and providing services. Of course, the concern of the court to ensure 
the dissemination of those standards merits consideration.
118
 
However, the same concern would apply to the need to disseminate a 
scientific paper revealing a new method of treating and curing 
cancer.
119
 No court would deny the right of that author to oppose the 
 
inspection and use (including reproduction of the respective literature). See Open Standards, 
FSFE, fsfe.org/activities/os/def.en.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015), which argues that open 
standards in IT “prevent lock-in and other artificial barriers to interoperability, and promote 
choice between vendors and technology solutions. FSFE pushes for the adoption of Open 
Standards to promote free competition in the IT market, as they ensure that people find it easy 
to migrate to Free Software or between Free Software solutions.” Id.  
 116.  See Target Engenharia, Ap. Civ. No. 9220380-29.2008.8.26.000, Relator: Mendes, at 
5, 11.3.2014 (Braz.). 
 117.  Id. at 5. 
 118.  In this regard, the court said: 
Indeed, the activity of coordinating, orienting and supervising the process of standard 
elaboration and of publishing them is intrinsically connected with the regular exercise 
of public activities, and therefore it must abide by the principles that preside over 
public administration, among them that of publicity, which must be respected, in 
facilitating their dissemination—and taking notice and emphasizing the nonprofit 
purpose of the plaintiff. 
Id. at 5. 
 119.  To a reader less familiar with patent law, it may sound strange that a scientist may 
wish to extract revenues from a new therapeutic method by means of copyright. However, 
copyright may be the only means available to him/her to be rewarded for his/her creation. 
Therapeutic methods may be excluded from patentability in accordance with Article 27.3(a) of 
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unauthorized reproduction of that paper, despite the life-saving 
importance of its contents. But the situation would be identical. 
Copyright law does not eliminate or hinder the spread of 
information. Quite the contrary, copyright encourages dissemination, 
since the more copies of technical standards the SSO sells, the more 
money it makes. The scientist who discovered a cure for cancer 
would think the same way: the more copies of his work that are sold, 
the more he gains. In the absence of copyright, an SSO would not 
waste time and resources developing standards that do not generate 
earnings. The scientist would react the same way: he would not invest 
his time and resources in disclosing such a fundamental discovery at 
his own expense. Copyright operates as an incentive to 
dissemination. It is not a barrier. 
The idea that copyright is not a barrier to the spread of 
information has been, without dissent, invoked by several US court 
opinions.
120
 In County of Suffolk, New York v. First American Real 
Estate Solutions, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that the right of citizens to access information generated by the 
government—provided it does not resemble the character of a law—
is not prevented by the exercise of copyright.
121
 On the contrary, such 
 
the TRIPS Agreement. This exclusion appears in most patent laws. Only very few countries 
grant them, such as the United States and Australia; and still in the United States the economic 
value of those patents is severely limited in view of limitations to their enforceability. See 35 
U.S.C. § 287(c) (2011). 
 120.  See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp. (Data Gen. I), 761 F. 
Supp. 185, 192 (D. Mass. 1991), aff’d (Data Gen. II), 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); see also 
supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 121.  Cnty. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 192 (2d Cir. 2001). 
The court articulated: 
First, FOIL (New York’s Freedom of Information Law) does not explicitly address 
what a recipient may or may not do once it receives the agency records; it provides 
only that the state agency must make the records available for public inspection and 
copying. Suffolk County may comply with both these mandates while maintaining its 
copyright. FOIL also does not prohibit a state agency from placing restrictions on how 
a record, if it were copyrighted, could be subsequently distributed. FOIL restricts only 
the fee which an agency may charge for copying or reproducing the record. Moreover, 
concluding that FOIL prohibits the state agency from initiating an infringement action 
also prevents that agency from taking action in the event that a reproduction 
inaccurately portrays the content of its record. Although there are limits to a state 
agency’s ability to restrict access to its records, Suffolk County is not attempting to 
restrict initial access but is attempting to restrict only the subsequent redistribution of 
its copyrighted works. There is nothing inconsistent between fulfilling FOIL’s goal of 
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an exercise leads to an increase of the spread of information. Only if 
the government refused to publish information and, by enforcing 
copyright, prevented citizens from having access to it, could the right 
be challenged.
122
 
Whereas some commentators and courts discuss excluding 
technical standards from copyright protection for the sake of 
facilitating dissemination, it seems that so far similar proposals have 
not been made with regards to the patentability of technical 
instructions that constitute standards. If the opponents of copyright 
prevailed, we could reach the paradoxical situation of seeing 
copyright protection refused to SSOs only to permit potential users of 
standards to obtain information on instructions whose use depends on 
the authorization of the patent holder. However, as explained, the 
suggestion that by eliminating copyright protection of voluntary 
standards, their dissemination would be facilitated is nonsense. 
Eliminating copyright would only disincentivize a private SSO from 
elaborating standards. The matter is not only of SSOs elaborating and 
using standards as a source of revenue, but SSOs acquiring financial 
sustainability by selling copyrighted standards.
123
 
It should be noted, however, that in very particular circumstances, 
copyrighted works incorporated into standards may be treated 
differently, i.e., they may be subject to the same regime that governs 
 
access and permitting a state agency to place reasonable restrictions on the 
redistribution of its copyrighted works. For example, an agency’s choice to notify the 
recipient that a portion of the record is protected by copyright law or an agency’s 
requirement that the recipient enter into a licensing agreement if it wishes to distribute 
the record commercially does not restrict initial access but only what the recipient may 
do once it acquires access. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 122.  The court, in Suffolk, explicitly acknowledged that freedom of information law 
imposes “limits to a state agency’s ability to restrict access to its records.” Id. 
 123.  The following joint statement by the ISO and the IEC is unequivocal: 
ISO and IEC International Standards are sold in order to help fund the very process 
that leads to their development. ISO and IEC members also adopt the International 
Standards as National Standards and sell these to help fund their own respective 
national standardization activities. Therefore, protection of copyright is, on many 
levels, fundamental to the sustainability of the international standardization system. 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO) & IEC, COPYRIGHT, 
STANDARDS AND THE INTERNET 3, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/copyright_information_ 
brochure.pdf. 
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patents. The reason is that some copyrighted works, such as computer 
software and creatively organized databases, even though only 
protected in their expressions or organization, have an impact on the 
use of the ideas conveyed by the protected expressions. This tension 
(which stems from the dilution of the dichotomy idea/expression) 
was acknowledged by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp: 
Certainly, a monopolist’s refusal to license others to use a 
commercially successful patented idea is likely to have more 
profound anti-competitive consequences than a refusal to allow 
others to duplicate the copyrighted expression of an 
unpatented idea (although such differences may become less 
pronounced if copyright law becomes increasingly protective 
of intellectual property such as computer software).
124
 
In reality, a copyrighted work’s expression may be so entangled with 
the ideas that, even though a full merger does not occur, it is 
nevertheless practically impossible to use the idea without infringing 
the copyrighted expression.
125
 This is true not only as far as the 
intention to develop interoperable products—when there is the need 
to know the software code—but also to manufacture and sell 
competing devices, which would not work properly without the 
computer program in question. In other words, alternativeness is not 
available for certain copyrighted works because they produce 
exclusivity not only as far as reproduction is concerned—a normal 
attribute of copyrights—but also as far as use is concerned—an 
attribute that normally pertains to industrial property, such as patent 
rights. 
In a nutshell, the copyrightability of standards lies in their private 
nature. Standards are creative/original works, and therefore nothing 
justifies their exclusion from protection unless they are mandatory in 
nature—when they are treated as statutes and regulations, and thus 
 
 124.  Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp. (Data Gen. II), 36 F.3d 1147, 1185 
(1st Cir. 1994). 
 125.  On the expansion of copyright into technical ideas, see generally Daryl Lim, 
Copyright under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine and the 
Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481 (2007). 
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fall under conventional and national exclusions. Adversaries of 
copyright in standards tend to confuse the expression of the standards 
with technical instructions. Copyright only covers the former. The 
latter may the subject matter of industrial property. These notions are 
based on multilateral law, namely the Berne Convention and the 
TRIPS Agreement, and therefore they are generally shared by most 
jurisdictions. Standards, on the other hand, when voluntary—as the 
vast majority of standards are—should not be confused with legal 
statutes and regulations, which are excluded from copyright. 
Voluntary standards are not mandatory, i.e., no one is obliged to 
comply with them, and therefore their dissemination is not a legal 
obligation.  
The only serious obstacle that may be raised as to the 
copyrightability of voluntary standards that consist or cover computer 
software and the organization of information. In this case, the 
expression/idea dichotom is blurred and the enforcement of copyright 
in the expression actually becomes enforcement in the conveyed 
ideas. But this is not a problem specific to standards—it is, indeed, a 
problem of copyright itself, which the TRIPS Agreement has 
extended to expressions of a technical nature, such as copyright and 
the creative arrangement of databases and other compilations of 
information (TRIPS, Article 10(1) and (2)). 
IV. TRADEMARKS AND STANDARDS 
The interface between trademarks and standards is invoked in five 
different contexts: (a) names given to technical standards; (b) third-
party trademarks mentioned in technical standards; (c) naming of 
SSOs’ standardization services; (d) designation of services of 
certification of compliance with standards;
126
 and (e) packaging and 
labeling standardized requirements.
127
 
 
 126.  The names given to technical standards and the names of certification services are not 
the same thing. An SSO that provides certification services may do so for all the standards it 
has adopted as well as standards established by other SSOs. 
 127.  The basic requirement for a sign to be protectable (and registrable) as a trademark is 
its capacity of distinguishing the goods and services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15. In short, a sign has to be distinctive 
in order to be considered a trademark. Distinctiveness may be inherent or may be acquired 
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 (a) Technical standards tend to be complex and prolix, and 
therefore the best way to designate them is by assigning them a 
short and distinctive name. That name—a genuine trademark, 
when distinctive—serves not only as an abbreviated 
designation of the standard, but also as a reference to a specific 
set of instructions in a world populated by numerous, 
competing standards.
128
 For example, IEEE 754 stands for a 
technical standard elaborated by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers, a private chartered association, that 
governs binary floating-point arithmetic. “It specifies number 
formats, basic operations, conversions, and exceptional 
conditions. The 2008 edition supersedes both the 754-1985 
standard and the related IEEE 854-1987 which generalized 
754-1985 to cover decimal arithmetic as well as binary.”129 
ISO 14001 stands for a standard elaborated by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), a non-governmental 
organization based in Geneva, Switzerland, that “sets out the 
criteria for an environmental management system . . . . It does 
not state requirements for environmental performance, but 
maps out a framework that a company or organization can 
follow to set up an effective environmental management 
system.”130 
IEEE 754 and ISO 14001 are trademarks for all purposes because 
they are distinctive of the standards they identify, even if the IEEE 
and ISO do not care for registering them. According to the Nice 
 
through use. Id. The TRIPS Agreement permits WTO Members to adopt other requirements, of 
a secondary nature, such as susceptibility of being visually perceptible. Id.; TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 14, art. 15.3). 
 128.  ISO’s website indicates that ISO has developed more than 19,500 standards. See 
Standards Catalogue, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics.htm (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2015). Many of those standards compete with standards set by other SSOs. Suppose 
that a telecommunications engineer is for a specific standard on how to design layout charts. 
Knowledge of the specific name of the standard in question will save an enormous amount of 
time for the researcher. This is the fundamental function of trademarks: to reduce search costs. 
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 168 (2001).  
 129. IEEE 754: Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic, IEEE.ORG, http://grouper. 
ieee.org/groups/754/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
 130. ISO 14000—Environmental Management, ISO.ORG, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/ 
standards/management-standards/iso14000.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
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Classification, a classification that organizes trade and service marks 
according to subject matter, they could be registered in classes 41 
(education) and 42 (technical and scientific services).
131
 
Trademarks that designate standards are common trademarks, and 
therefore they abide by the legal regime that applies in normal 
circumstances. Trademark holders can enforce exclusive rights 
against third-party use, or the use of similar designations, that would 
result in a likelihood of confusion with the similar or identical signs 
for similar or identical services.
132
 However, it can be expected that 
standard names will be often cited in third-party technical and 
commercial literature, including users of the standards, once the 
standard reaches technical or commercial success. This use of 
trademarks by third parties for informative purposes is generally 
known as fair use, and it is widely allowed.
133
 
(b) Technical standards provide technical instructions for the 
production of goods and services. Some standards may refer to 
 
 131.  The Nice Classification was established by the WIPO-administered Nice Agreement, 
of 1957, and consists of an international classification of goods and services applied for the 
registration of marks. The classification is revised regularly. Nice Classification, NCL (10-
2015), June 23, 2014 (10th ed.) (effective Jan. 1, 2015), available at http://web2.wipo.int/nef/ 
en/project/1418/NC015 (in Spanish, available at http://www.wipo.int/classifications/en/news/ 
nice/2014/news_0003.html). 
 132.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 16.1. 
 133.  On fair use of trademarks, see MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 75, at 231–34 (entry on 
“Trademark Fair Use”). McCarthy makes a distinction between two sorts of trademark fair use. 
The first modality is the use of third-party marks with a descriptive purpose, i.e. “only to 
describe the [non-mark holder]’s goods or services, or their geographic origin, or to name the 
person running the business.” Id. at 231. McCarthy calls this “classic fair use.” This applies to 
signs that initially are not distinctive but have acquired distinctiveness through secondary 
meaning. The example he gives is “Payless” as a trademark for discount consumer stores. He 
says that a competitor “would probably have a right to make fair use in a non-service mark 
sense, such as ‘At Target stores, we guarantee you will pay less!’ or ‘Want to pay less? Come to 
Target stores’.” Id. at 232. This means that, in the first example of fair use, trademarks are not 
used by third parties as trademarks, but rather as descriptive terms. The second modality 
corresponds to the use by a third party of another’s mark with the purpose of designating the 
latter’s products and services (and not the own products of services of the user). McCarthy 
designates this modality as “nominative fair use.” Id. at 231, 233. This is the most common 
version of trademark fair use. Whenever one designates a third party’s product or service by its 
trademark, he or she is using that trademark with the purpose of information. Article 17 of the 
TRIPS Agreement covers both fair uses. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 17 
(“Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair 
use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests 
of the owner of the trademark and of third parties.”). 
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specific materials or ingredients that are unique, in the sense 
they have no market substitutes, or at least the SSOs does not 
trust the quality of substitutes. In this case, standards may 
designate those materials or ingredients by citing their 
trademarks. 
This practical way of identifying precise materials and ingredients 
raises a competitive problem for manufacturers. The use of 
trademarked materials in standards induces the manufacturers that 
abide by those standards to acquire the trademarked products. 
Producers of competing ingredients might find it very hard to 
persuade those manufacturers to use the substitute ingredients.
134
 To 
effectively incorporate their competing products into the standard, 
producers of the competing products would need to persuade the SSO 
to change the standard in question. This aspect was raised by the 
study elaborated for the European Commission that was cited 
above.
135
 The authors have received opposite views as to the use of 
trademarks as references to ingredients of standards. One view was 
that such use is convenient when it references a second, trademarked 
standard, when it refers to technology that is trademarked but freely 
available, or when accompanied with the term “or equivalent.”
136
 The 
opposite states that, “[w]henever possible, reference to trademarks in 
 
 134.  One might see here a parallel between the citation of trademarked goods and the 
inclusion of patented technology in a standard. The situations are nevertheless different to the 
extent the trademarked good may have substitutes on the market, whereas the patented 
invention that is essential for the standard may not be replaced. 
 135.  See Blind et al., supra note 2. The study reports on the analysis of about 250 
standards of the most important SSOs that include technologies covered by intellectual 
property. The authors acknowledge it is a small figure as compared to the hundreds of 
thousands of standards available, but they trust that their findings reveal a trend. The authors’ 
conclusion was that the European Commission should continue encouraging voluntary 
standards including FRAND commitments. Attention to anticompetitive behavior should be 
paid and cooperation with intellectual property offices should be ensured so as to better detect 
prior art. See id. at 11–13 (Executive Summary). On the specific relationship between standards 
and trademarks, the report states two opposite trends: (a) citing trademarks in standards is 
“Required and appropriate if: reference to another standard that is trademarked; reference to 
technology that is trademarked and freely available; in other cases if followed by the words ‘or 
equivalent’,” versus (b) “Whenever possible, reference to trademarks in standards should be 
avoided; when impossible to avoid, has to be done cautiously and subject to appropriate 
safeguards; risks resulting in undue competitive advantages for trademark holders.” Id. at 201. 
 136.  Id. at 201. 
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standards should be avoided; when impossible to avoid, has to be 
done cautiously and subject to appropriate safeguards; risks resulting 
in undue competitive advantages for trademark holders.”
137
 
In any event, this use of trademark-protected ingredients in 
standards is “nominative fair use.” Trademark owners may not 
prevent this sort of use when it has an informative purpose.
138
 Fair 
use is allowed by Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement.
139
  
(c) The third context in which trademarks may interact with 
standards is perhaps the most obvious: the designation of the 
services provided by SSOs. For example, ISO 14001 is an ISO 
standard. In the expression “ISO standard,” ISO is not only an 
acronym that designates the SSO, but also a service mark to 
the extent it designates the services provided by the ISO of 
elaborating international technical standards.
140
 ISO, used in 
the “ISO 14001” context, is clearly a service mark, like those 
marks mentioned in modality (a). 
(d) The fourth context, SSO verification and certification 
services, is close to the previous modality, but presents 
significant differences. There are SSOs that, besides 
elaborating standards, also verify and certify manufacturers’ 
compliance with those same standards they elaborate. There 
are also independent organizations that provide the same 
compliance services, such as the International Standards 
Certifications (ISC),
141
 and the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC), but concerning standards developed by third parties.
142
 
 
 137.  See id. 
 138.  MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 75, at 231 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 17. If the reference to third-party marks is 
not distortive, fair use in technical standards is actually favorable to the mark holder to the 
extent it advertises the protected product. 
 140.  ISO claims ownership in its logo and acronym (or short name), and has both 
registered as trademarks. See ISO name and logo, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/ 
name_and_logo.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).  
 141.  See INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS CERTIFICATION, http://isc-worldwide.com (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2015). The ISC mainly provides certification for a wide range of industry and 
business, from infrastructure, such as construction and water and waste energy, to consumer 
goods, such as beverages, and retail in general. Id. 
 142. See MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
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Acronyms like ISC and MSC, like the names of certifying entities 
and corresponding logos, besides designating the entities and the 
services they provide, also serve as certification marks.
143
 In this 
sense, the marks of certifying organizations are employed by 
companies that sell products or services that comply with certain 
standards, as certified by those same entities.
144
 
In this fourth context, unlike in the first three, standardization 
causes a strong impact on trademark registration and protection. 
Because of that impact, certification marks follow a regime that is 
different from the one that applies to trade and service marks. Two 
main aspects distinguish certification marks from normal trademarks, 
either individually or collectively owned. First, certification marks 
may only be used for distinguishing goods or services sold by third 
parties. They may not be used by the certifying entities to distinguish 
goods and services that they eventually sell. This aspect is reflected 
in the Lanham Act.
145
 The reason is one of potential conflicts of 
 
The MSC mainly provides certification for sustainable seafood. Id. 
 143.  Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006), 
The term “certification mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof— 
 (1) used by a person other than its owner, or 
 (2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other than the owner 
to use in commerce and files an application to register on the principal register 
established by this chapter, to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of 
manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or 
services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members 
of a union or other organization. 
Id. 
 144.  See, e.g., the website of “All But Gluten” products, which claims that the firm’s 
products are certified “by those you trust.” The site mentions two certifications: the Gluten Free 
Certification Program (GFCP), awarded by the National Foundation for Celiac Awareness; and 
the Orthodox Union, certifying that the specified products are kosher. Resources: Certified by 
those you trust, ALL BUT GLUTEN, http://allbutgluten.com/resources/plant-certification (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2015). See also the website of Re-Bello, a fashion apparel brand, which claims 
the certification of no less than six certification organizations and displays their logos. 
Sustainability: Our Certificates, RE-BELLO, http://www.re-bello.com/sustainability/our-
certificates/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
 145.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006): 
The term “certification mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof – 
(1) used by a person other than its owner, or 
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interests and corresponds to the fact that certification entities may not 
certify themselves. 
Second, the certifier cannot refuse to certify third parties that 
strictly comply with the standards overseen by the certifier. This 
obligation to certify third parties is explicitly present in the statutes of 
other countries and it can be submitted that it is implicit in the 
Lanham Act.
146
 This rule prevents arbitrariness in the certification 
services, to the extent that the certifying entity may not refuse the 
permission for the use of its certification mark if the inspected 
company abides by the rules. Because this rule amounts to a 
compulsory license, in the case the certifying entity refuses 
permission, the inspected company can nevertheless use the 
certification mark. The certifying entity keeps, however, the right to 
be remunerated for that use.
147
 
As stated, this situation closely resembles a compulsory license, 
which results from the distortion caused by the interference of market 
 
(2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other than the owner 
to use in commerce . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 146.  See, e.g., Industrial Property Rights Law, Promulgating the Law on Industrial 
Property Rights, Royal Decree No. 67, May 18, 2008, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=11876 (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) (Oman) (“Any person who has 
proved to comply with the technical standards and other conditions of the Rules mentioned in 
Section 43(1) shall not be refused the right to use the certification sign in the same conditions 
established by those Rules”). It can be submitted, however, that where the Lanham Act refers to 
the bona fide intention of the certification mark owner to authorize others to use the mark it is 
implying the owner’s duty to license. This duty has already been qualified as a “limited 
‘compulsory license’ in that it requires the certifier to permit the use of the certification mark by 
anyone who meets the standards.” See MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 75, at 64. 
 147.  It may sound unfair to impose the payment of remuneration on the compulsory use of 
certification marks, given that its compulsory nature stems from an arbitrary refusal to certify 
by the certifying entity. But it is not. First, one should not forget that certification marks are 
private property and unauthorized use of private property is not permitted without 
compensation. The only instance in which the TRIPS Agreement allows granting compulsory 
licenses for less remuneration than adequate compensation is the remedy of an anticompetitive 
practice. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(k). The TRIPS Agreement does not 
apply to certification trademarks, see NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF 
TRADEMARKS AND DESIGNS 198 (3d ed., 2014), and Article 31(k) is about patents, but the 
analogy is a matter of course. Second, certification marks are not only private property, but the 
work of creating certification marks entails costs. The arbitrary refusal by the certifying entity 
to license its mark may be sanctioned by damages (or, in certain cases, by fines set by the 
supervising governmental agency), but not at the expenses of loss of private property. 
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regulation to accomplish standardization. Article 21 of the TRIPS 
Agreement prohibits compulsory licenses of trademarks, but 
certification marks are not regular marks and, therefore, are not 
covered by the Agreement.
148
 
(e) The fifth context, which concerns packaging and labeling 
standardized requirements, is also deeply affected by the 
impact of market regulation. However, this impact is not on the 
use of trademark rights, but on the use of the trademarks 
themselves—a matter which the TRIPS Agreement addresses 
in Article 20 by permitting encumbrances on the use of 
trademarks, where justified.
149
 
The field in which Article 20 acquires more relevance—and becomes 
more controversial—is public health.
150
 Special labeling and 
packaging requirements adopted by WTO Members have particularly 
affected three areas: (i) pharmaceutical products; (ii) nutrition; and 
(iii) tobacco. In regard of these areas WTO Members have adopted 
special requirements that encumber the use of trademarks, which 
calls for an analysis of whether they are justified under Article 20.  
 
 148.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 21 (“Members may determine conditions 
on the licensing and assignment of trademarks, it being understood that the compulsory 
licensing of trademarks shall not be permitted . . . .”). On the possibility of compulsory licenses 
of certification marks, see PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 147 at 372. 
 149.  Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement provides, in part: 
The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encumbered by 
special requirements, such as use with another trademark, use in a special form or use 
in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 20. 
 150.  Thus far, packaging and labeling-related trademark controversies have emerged under 
public health considerations, namely in the areas of pharmaceutical generic products, infant 
baby milk formula, fast food, and tobacco. As a matter of course, packaging and labeling 
standards affects other industries, but no public policy has raised as much controversy as those 
mentioned. A brief search to the reports of the meetings of the TBT Committee provides clear 
evidence of this. 
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A. Labeling and Packaging Standards Affecting the Use of 
Trademarks of Pharmaceutical Products 
In a 1999 statute, Brazil adopted the following definition of 
generic pharmaceutical products: 
Article 3, XXI—Generic medicine—medicine similar to a 
product of reference or pioneer product, which is intended to 
be interchangeable with the latter, generally produced after the 
expiry or the abandonment of patent protection or of other 
exclusive rights, upon proof of its efficacy, safety and quality, 
and designated by the CBD [Common Brazilian Denominator] 
or, in its absence, by the ICD [International Common 
Denominator].
151
 
In other words, generic medicines in Brazil must be designated by 
their generic or non-proprietary names, not by trademarks.
152
 In 
addition, the Brazilian sanitary agency has introduced requirements 
regarding the packaging of generic pharmaceuticals, including rules 
on the size and colors of certain characters.
153
 
These measures seem compatible with Article 20 because they 
aim to foster the competitiveness of generic products, put price 
pressure on branded drugs, and alleviate the burden imposed by 
branded pharmaceutical products on public health program budgets. 
Reducing the appealing effect of registered trademarks on the 
packaging and labeling of pharmaceuticals invites patients to trust 
generic products in the same way they trust name-brand products. 
 
 151.  Lei No. 9.787, de 10 de Fevereiro de 1999, [Law No. 9787, of Feb. 10, 1999], 
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9787.htm (Braz.) (translated by author). 
 152.  The Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) confirms this 
understanding by explaining on its website: “On the package of generics it must be stated 
‘Generic Medicine’ inside a yellow ribbon. In addition, the reference to Law nr. 9,787/99 must 
be stated. Because generics have no trademarks, what you read on the package is the medicine’s 
active principle.” Manual of Drug Packaging, available at http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/wps/ 
wcm/connect/fb84e68045c83f28a0bde2d10ee53f37/Manual+identidade+visual+medicamentos
+SUS_DAF_11_09_14_atualizad.pdf?MOD=AJPERES); see also ANVISA, MANUAL DE 
EMBALAGENS DE MEDICAMENTOS [MANUAL OF VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FOR PACKAGES OF 
MEDICINES AND NEW RULES ON LABELING OF MEDICINES] (Sept. 2014), available at 
portal.anvisa.gov.br/wps/content/Anvisa+Portal/Anvisa/Inicio/Medicamentos/Assunto+de+Inte
resse/Bulas+e+Rotulos+de+medicamentos/Rotulos. 
 153.  See ANVISA, supra note 152.  
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Therefore, several WTO Members have established requirements for 
the size and colors of brand marks printed on generic pharmaceutical 
packages. In a large number of WTO member countries, the 
advertisement of prescription drugs is also prohibited, so as to avoid 
the unwarranted pressure by patients on doctors. These measures may 
impose severe limitations on the strategic marketing and the use of 
trademarks by pharmaceutical companies. But, where justified by the 
public interest, those encumbrances are acceptable. Of course, those 
measures have a negative impact on the value of trademarks. This 
impact is justifiable, because Article 20 is not constrained by the 
legitimate interest of trademark holders. These are relevant for the 
purposes of Article 17, not of Article 20.
154
 
B. Labeling and Packaging Standards Affecting the Use of 
Trademarks of Nutrition-Related Products 
Because of nutrition’s immediate impact on health, the industry in 
nutrition has also been the subject of special requirements that have 
encumbered the use of trademarks. One particular sector that comes 
to mind is fast food, against which certain WTO Members have taken 
measures to discourage advertisement and promotion, particularly 
those aimed at children.
155
 Another sector where restrictions are 
increasingly being imposed is that of alcoholic beverages. For 
example, in March 2014, Thailand notified the WTO Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade of restrictions imposed on the labeling of 
 
 154.  As explained elsewhere, Articles 17 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement have different 
scopes. Article 17 is about exceptions to rights conferred (as a consequence of which third 
parties, under certain circumstances can use trademarks owned by others). Article 20 is about 
restrictions on the use of trademarks of products whose commercialization is not prohibited but 
it is regulated. Exceptions to rights are limited by the need to protect the legitimate interests of 
trademark owners. Encumbrances on the use of trademarks are not so. The only condition 
imposed by Article 20, besides justifiability, is that the encumbrances should not operate in a 
manner detrimental to the trademarks’ capability of distinguishing. On this subtle but important 
matter, see PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 147, at 331; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, 
arts. 17, 20. 
 155.  Fast food advertisements aimed at children are prohibited in Quebec, Canada, and in 
the United Kingdom. In 2008 the FTC recommended that advertisement should be oriented to 
healthier food. See Tirtha Dhar & Kathy Baylis, Fast-Food Consumption and the Ban on 
Advertising Targeting Children: The Quebec Experience, 48 J. MARKETING R. 799 (2011), 
available at http://foodsecurecanada.org/sites/default/files/fastfoodconsumption.pdf. 
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alcoholic beverages.
156
 The restrictions attempt to avoid associating 
the consumption of alcohol with subliminal messages of social and 
sexual success, sports performance, and happiness.
157
 To the extent 
those measures ban certain uses of names and drawings that are or 
may be protected as trademarks, they naturally affect the use of 
trademarks as well as of copyrighted works (the use of cartoons 
conveying those ideas having also been banned).
158
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations’ 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have proposed several measures 
addressing the way breast-milk substitutes are marketed. The main 
purpose of those measures is to avoid the belief that breast-milk 
substitutes are marketed as effective substitutes of the natural 
product.
159
 The International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk 
Substitutes contains two measures that directly impact trademarks: 
Article 4.2 on information and education directs that: 
When such [informational and educational] materials contain 
information about the use of infant formula, they should 
include the social and financial implications of its use; the 
health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods; and, 
in particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use 
of infant formula and other breast-milk substitutes. Such 
materials should not use any pictures or text which may 
idealize the use of breast-milk substitutes.
160
 
The second measure, Article 9.2 on labeling, directs that: 
Neither the container nor the label should have pictures of 
infants, nor should they have other pictures or text which may 
 
 156.  See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Draft Notification of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control, Re: Rules, Procedure and condition for Labels of Alcoholic Beverages, 
issued under B.E., G/TBT/N/THA/437 (Mar. 28, 2014) (WTO), available at http://www. 
inmetro.gov.br/barreirastecnicas/pontofocal/textos/notificacoes/THA_437.pdf. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes, 1981 (WHO). available 
at http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/code_english.pdf (also published as International 
Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes, 1981 (UNICEF), available at http://www.unicef. 
org/nutrition/files/nutrition_code_english.pdf). 
 160.  Id. art. 4.2. 
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idealize the use of infant formula. They may, however, have 
graphics for easy identification of the product as a breast-milk 
substitute and for illustrating methods of preparation. The 
terms “humanized”, “materialize” or similar terms should not 
be used.
161
 
Though the Code does not mention trademarks explicitly, 
manufacturer’s marks cannot be used with photos or designs of 
infants on packages of infant food formulae. The same treatment is 
extended to designs that idealize the consumption of breast-milk 
substitutes, namely those that associate the consumption of 
substitutes with feelings of happiness, joy, and well-being.
162
 
UNICEF reports that, so far, eighty-four countries have enacted 
legislation implementing the Code.
163
  
These encumbrances to the use of trademarks in the context of fast 
food, alcoholic beverages, and infant formulae are consistent with 
Article 20, given their obvious health-related justification. Concerned 
WTO Members, however, are bound by two obligations imposed by 
the TRIPS Agreement. First, in spite of the use of trademarks being 
restricted or even banned, WTO Members must provide for their 
registration and protection.
164
 Second, when the use is banned, the 
ban must be accepted as a valid reason for non-use and therefore the 
 
 161.  Id. art. 9.2. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  UNICEF reports that fourteen other countries have drafted legislation that is awaiting 
approval. See International Code of Marketing of Brest-milk Substitutes, UNICEF (Jan. 12, 
2005), http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/index_24805.html. It seems that in the 1990s, even 
before the TRIPS Agreement became applicable to developing countries, Guatemala challenged 
the owner of the well-known trademark GERBER, then the property of a US company. Based 
on legislation implementing the World Health Organization (WHO)/United Nations 
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) Code, the government of Guatemala 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade the owner of the GERBER trademark to cease using the photo 
of a baby in its products. Alleging that the requested measure was an expropriation of its 
trademark and threatening to take the dispute to the WTO, the company convinced the 
Guatemalan government to withdraw their request. Information on the dispute, which ended 
with a national court opinion finding in favor of the trademark owner, is available at The 
Gerber Baby—Trademark or Con Artist? INFACT CANADA, http://www.infactcanada.ca/ 
gerbbaby.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
 164.  Article 15.4 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: “The nature of the goods or services 
to which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the 
trademark.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15.4. 
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countries’ authorities must not cancel the registrations of trademarks 
whose use is thus affected. 
165
 
C. Labeling and Packaging Standards Affecting the Use of 
Trademarks of Tobacco Products 
In the field of tobacco, the WHO has also adopted 
recommendations that strongly impact the use of trademarks with the 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).
166
 
Article 11 of the FCTC, on packaging and labeling of tobacco 
products, provides: 
1. Each Party shall, within a period of three years after entry 
into force of this Convention for that Party, adopt and 
implement, in accordance with its national law, effective 
measures to ensure that: 
 (a) tobacco product packaging and labelling [sic] do not 
promote a tobacco product by any means that are false, 
misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous 
impression about its characteristics, health effects, hazards or 
emissions, including any term, descriptor, trademark, 
figurative or any other sign that directly or indirectly creates 
the false impression that a particular tobacco product is less 
harmful than other tobacco products. These may include terms 
such as “low tar,” “light,” “ultra-light,” or “mild”; and 
 
 165.  Article 19.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 
If use is required to maintain a registration, the registration may be cancelled only after 
an uninterrupted period of at least three years of non-use, unless valid reasons based on 
the existence of obstacles to such use are shown by the trademark owner. 
Circumstances arising independently of the will of the owner of the trademark which 
constitute an obstacle to the use of the trademark, such as import restrictions on or 
other government requirements for goods or services protected by the trademark, shall 
be recognized as valid reasons for non-use. 
Id. art. 19.1. 
 166. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, FCTC, http://www.who.int/ 
fctc/text_download/en/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). The FCTC entered into force on February 
27, 2005. Id. The text of and information about the FCTC are available at WHO.INT/FCTC, 
http://www.who.int/fctc/en/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015); Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, June 16, 2003 (WHO), available at http://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/ 
[hereinafter FCTC]. 
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 (b) each unit packet and package of tobacco products and 
any outside packaging and labelling [sic] of such products also 
carry health warnings describing the harmful effects of tobacco 
use . . . .
167
 
These provisions are worded very broadly and, therefore, leave health 
authorities with broad discretion. It is true that the FCTC, as far as 
trademarks are concerned, and to the extent it bans means that are 
false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous 
impression, does not seem to go beyond measures that avoid 
deception. In other words, apparently the FCTC does not intent to 
restrict the use of tobacco trademarks that do not cause an erroneous 
impression on the dangerous characteristics of tobacco. But it implies 
the importance of measures aiming at reducing consumption—which 
is, ultimately, the overall thrust of the FCTC.
168
 A growing number of 
countries have adopted requirements concerning the mandatory 
printing of images and illustrations, with a limited area on packages 
left for the brand marks. In addition, trademarks that include terms 
like “light” that create the false impression that one product is less 
harmful than another are banned.
169
 Other countries have prohibited 
the use of tobacco-related marks on non-tobacco goods to reduce the 
goodwill associated to those marks and thus limit their power to 
 
 167.  FCTC, supra note 166, art. 11(1)(a)-(b). 
 168.  The thrust of the FCTC is to reduce absolute distinctiveness of tobacco trademarks by 
reducing their attractiveness. See PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 147, at 331. In doing so, the 
purpose of the FCTC is to reduce consumption. The WHO is unequivocal in this regard: the 
main purpose of the Convention is to “control the tobacco epidemic.” See WHO, HISTORY OF 
THE WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 1 (2009), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241563925_eng.pdf?ua=1. In the same sense, 
Australia’s Health Department, in introducing the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act (TPPA), 
indicates four objectives, the first one being “to reduce the attractiveness and appeal of tobacco 
products to consumers, particularly young people.” WHO, History of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control 1 (2009), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/ 
2009/9789241563925_eng.pdf?ua=1; see also Introduction of Tobacco Plain Packaging in 
Australia, DEP’T OF HEALTH () (Austl.), http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/ 
Content/tobacco-plain (last visited Mar. 2, 2015); infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 169.  See, e.g., Law on the Control of Tobacco Consumption, Law No. 18,256, art. 8 
(2008) (Uru.). Under the framework of a bilateral investment treatment between Switzerland 
and Uruguay, Philip Morris is challenging Uruguay’s special requirements. See Fernando 
Cabrera Diaz, Philip Morris initiates arbitration against Uruguay over new labeling 
requirements, taxes INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (May 11, 2010), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2010/ 
05/11/philip-morris-initiates-arbitration-against-uruguay-over-new-labeling-requirements-taxes/. 
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induce consumption.
170
 Another measure is the prohibition to sell 
tobacco product-shaped items—any sort of items, such as candy 
cigarettes—targeting infants and youth.171 This statute may affect 
both figurative trademarks and industrial designs. But the best 
known—and perhaps most radical—measure implementing Article 
11 of the FCTC is the so-called plain packaging schemes, such as the 
one adopted by Australia.
172
 To discourage the use of tobacco 
products, the Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Act of 2011 
 
 170.  This measure was adopted in Canada, for example. See Simon V. Potter, The 
Expropriation of Intellectual Property, 8 REV. CANADIENNE DE PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE 
59 (1991). 
 171.  See Decreto No. 12.921, de 26 de Dezembro de 2013, [Decree No. 12,921, of Dec. 
26, 2013] DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.12.13 (Braz.). 
 172.  A quick search on Google.com of “Australia plain packaging” produced no less than 
1,790,000 results (on Feb. 7, 2015). Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011A00148 [hereinafter TPPA]. See TPPA, at ch 2, 
§§ 18–29 (“Requirements for Retail Packaging of Tobacco Products”). See Request for 
Consultations by Ukraine, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS434/1 
(Mar. 15, 2012); Request for Consultations by Honduras, Australia—Certain Measures 
Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 2012); Request for Consultations by the 
Dominican Republic, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical 
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging, WT/DS441/1 (July 23, 2012); Request for Consultations by Cuba, Australia—
Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS458/1 (May 
3, 2013); Result for Consultations by Indonesia, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS467/1 (Sept. 25, 2013). See Plain cigarette 
packaging law planned by Irish government, BBC NEWS (May 28, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-22690032. See Plain packaging, NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF HEALTH (last 
updated Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.health.govt.nz/our-work/preventative-health-wellness/ 
tobacco-control/plain-packaging. See ANVISA Will defend Adoption of Cigarette Pack 
‘Generic’, FOLHA DE S. PAULO (Dec. 30 2013), http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/ saudeciencia/ 
145726-anvisa-vai-defender-adocao-de-maco-de-cigarro-generico.shtml. Article 15.4, as noted 
above in note 164, supra, and the accompanying text, restricts the rights of WTO Members to 
deny the registrability of trademarks based on the nature of th e goods or services to which they 
are to be applied. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15.4. In addition to Article 15.4, WTO 
Members are also bound by the provisions of Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention as far 
as conditions for the exclusion of distinctive signs from registrability are concerned. See TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15.2: “Paragraph 1 shall not be understood to prevent a Member 
from denying registration of a trademark on other grounds, provided that they do not derogate 
from the provisions of the Paris Convention (1967).” Id. 
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(TPPA),
173
 among other measures, significantly restricts the use of 
trademarks on tobacco packages, such as the number of times the 
marks may appear, as well as their size and color.
174
 The Australian 
initiative has upset several WTO Members, which have filed requests 
for consultations and the establishment of panels under the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
175
 However, similar measures are 
under consideration in a number of other WTO member countries, 
such as Ireland,
176
 New Zealand
177
 and Brazil.
178
 
Like food and alcohol packaging restrictions, encumbrances on 
the use of trademarks on the packaging of tobacco are TRIPS 
compliant. As said, the TRIPS Agreement permits restrictions or 
encumbrances on the use of trademarks, if justifiable.
179
 But the 
Agreement does not permit limitations to the acquisition and 
registration of trademark rights, except those that are precisely 
mentioned by the Agreement.
180
 To avoid conflict with the TRIPS 
Agreement, the TPPA was carefully drafted to make clear that 
tobacco trademarks are still registrable and enforceable.
181
 
 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  TPPA §§20(3) and 21. 
 175.  See in particular the TPPA, supra note 172, § 28 (“Effect on the Trade Marks Act 
1995 of non-use of trade mark as a result of this Act”). Section 29 of the TPPA adds provisions 
ensuring that restrictions on the use of designs shall not be the basis for licenses or revocation 
of designs. Id. § 29. 
 176.   See supra note 172. 
 177.  Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Will 
Investor-State Arbitration Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing Up in Smoke?, 
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-
v-uruguay-will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/. 
178. See supra note 172. 
 179.  See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 180.  Article 15.4, as noted above in note 164, supra, and the accompanying text, restricts 
the rights of WTO Members to deny the registrability of trademarks based on the nature of the 
goods or services to which they are to be applied. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15.4. 
In addition to Article 15.4, WTO Members are also bound by the provisions of Article 
6quinquies of the Paris Convention as far as conditions for the exclusion of distinctive signs 
from registrability are concerned. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15.2: “Paragraph 1 
shall not be understood to prevent a Member from denying registration of a trademark on other 
grounds, provided that they do not derogate from the provisions of the Paris Convention 
(1967).” Id. 
 181.  See in particular the TPPA, supra note 172, § 28 (“Effect on the Trade Marks Act 
1995 of non-use of trade mark as a result of this Act”). Section 29 of the TPPA adds provisions 
ensuring that restrictions on the use of designs shall not be the basis for licenses or revocation 
of designs. Id. § 29. 
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The tobacco industry has challenged packaging requirements 
because they constitute an expropriation of trademarks.
182
 At the 
outset, it should be recalled that the TRIPS Agreement does not 
prohibit the taking of intellectual property assets upon the payment of 
compensation.
183
 What the TRIPS Agreement prohibits is their taking 
without fair compensation.
184
 However, plain package schemes do 
not expropriate trademarks because their holders continue to own and 
enforce the marks in question.
185
 However, the fact that plain 
 
 182.  Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Will 
investor-State arbitration send restrictions on tobacco marketing up in smoke?, INVESTMENT 
TREATY NEWS (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-
will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/. A large 
part of the opinion of the High Court of Australia that approved the TPPA on constitutional 
grounds dealt with two issues: whether the TTPA led to a taking of tobacco trademarks (the 
answer was ‘no’) and whether the government was actually using tobacco packages to convey 
public health-related messages to consumers (the answer was ‘yes,’ but such use did not give 
rise to compensation). See infra note 188. 
 183.  See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 184.  The Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement also has language that may be construed as 
implicitly prohibiting the taking of intellectual property for public use without compensation. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(h); id. at Preamble ¶ 4. This same issue was analyzed 
and decided in the same manner by the High Court of Australia, in 2012, upon claims 
formulated by two tobacco manufacturers against the enactment of the TPPA. See JT Int’l SA v 
Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.). For a summary of the claims and a description of the 
holdings, see Sam Ricketson, Plain packaging legislation for tobacco products and trade marks 
in the High Court of Australia, 3 QUEEN MARY J. INT. PROP. 224 (2013); see also infra note 
188 and accompanying text. 
 185.  Subsection 3 of Section 29 of the TTPA provides in this regard: 
To avoid doubt, for the purposes of sections 38 and 84A of the Trade Marks Act 1995, 
and regulations 17A.27 and 17A.42A of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995: 
   (a) the operation of this Act; or 
   (b) the circumstance that a person is prevented, by or under this Act, from using a 
trade mark on or in relation to the retail packaging of tobacco products, or on tobacco 
products; 
are not circumstances that make it reasonable or appropriate: 
   (c) not to register the trade mark; or 
   (d) to revoke the acceptance of an application for registration of the trade mark; or 
   (e) to register the trade mark subject to conditions or limitations; or 
   (f) to revoke the registration of the trade mark. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, § 29.3. It follows from this language that tobacco 
trademarks, albeit subject to the encumbrances imposed by the TPPA, are fully entitled to 
registration and, hence, to protection. 
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packaging schemes lead to a loss of attractiveness and appealing in 
tobacco trademarks, and thereby cause a reduction in sales (at least 
that is what those schemes intend to achieve) generates a loss in their 
commercial value. As corporate assets, tobacco trademarks impacted 
by plain packaging have a loss in value. This might be seen as a form 
of taking, which must be compensated. However, the reduction of 
trademarks’ value in pursuance of collective goals and in accordance 
with public policies does not constitute a taking. There is just the 
reduction in the value of trademarks. The reduction of the value of 
private property in pursuance of collective goals has been held by the 
United States Supreme Court as not constituting a taking, particularly 
in view of the fact that the regulatory encumbrance does not prevent 
the economic exploitation of the asset.
186
 This scenario is therefore 
different from a situation where a government imposes a compulsory 
license on a patent and sets the royalty rate at a fixed amount of the 
patented product net sales price.  
This royalty scheme would undoubtedly transfer revenue from 
one individual to another, and this is what explains the TRIPS 
provision on mandatory payment of adequate remuneration to the 
patent holder (Article 31(h)).
187
 However, plain packaging does not 
lead to the transfer of revenue to other individuals, or to the 
government; nobody gains additional revenue just because the use of 
tobacco trademarks is restricted. This approach was adopted by the 
High Court of Australia, which held that there can be no taking (of 
private property) where there is no acquisition (of that property) by 
 
 186.  In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Supreme 
Court of the United States discussed whether New York’s Landmarks Preservation Law 
generated a taking because of restrictions imposed on certain modifications to the building (the 
Penn Central Station) that would significantly change its exterior. The Court held: 
On this record, we conclude that the application of New York City’s Landmarks Law 
has not effected a “taking” of appellants’ property. The restrictions imposed are 
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare, and not only permit 
reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site, but also afford appellants opportunities 
further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other properties. 
Penn Central Station, 438 U.S. at 138. 
 187.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(h). 
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the State or any other person.
188
 At most, national health departments 
(in those countries where universal healthcare exists) may save 
taxpayers’ money as a consequence of the reduction in need for 
medical treatment of those infirmities that result from tobacco 
consumption. However, this result is too remotely separated from the 
constraints on the use of trademarks so as to lead to the finding of an 
acquisition.  
Another argument promoted by the tobacco industry is that plain 
package schemes encourage counterfeiting.
189
 The reason is that, in 
the absence of differentiating brands, trademark owners would have 
no economic or legal incentive to sue counterfeiters. Moreover, 
trademarks with diminished absolute distinctiveness (as a result of 
the limited size of printed brands and the ban on respective colors) 
are more easily confused by consumers, and therefore impairs their 
ability to choose.
190
 This argument is contradictory and self-
 
 188.  JT International SA [2012] HCA 43, ¶ 44: 
In summary, the TPPA is part of a legislative scheme which places controls on the way 
in which tobacco products can be marketed. While the imposition of those controls 
may be said to constitute a taking in the sense that the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their 
intellectual property rights and related rights is restricted, the corresponding imposition 
of controls on the packaging and presentation of tobacco products does not involve the 
accrual of a benefit of a proprietary character to the Commonwealth which would 
constitute an acquisition. 
Id ¶ 44 (French, C.J.); see also, e.g., ¶¶ 101,143 (Gummow, J.), 181 (Hayne, J. & Bell, J.), 357 
(Kieffel, J.) (“The loss of trade or business does not spell acquisition. Although the protection 
afforded by s 51(xxxi) [Australia’s constitutional provision that guarantees that the acquisition 
of private property by the State can be made only on just terms] to the owner of property is 
wide, it is a protection directed to proprietary interests and not to the commercial position of 
traders”). 
 189.  The position articulated by the International Chamber of Commerce: “Plain 
packaging makes it easier for packaging to be copied by counterfeiters, exposing consumers to 
products of unknown and potentially dangerous ingredients.” See, e.g., Plain Packaging, 
BRITISH AM. TOBACCO, http://www.bat.com/plainpackaging (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
 190.  These arguments have been endorsed by the International Chamber of Commerce in 
its analysis of the TPPA, as follows: 
 The Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) recognizes the 
health concerns associated with this issue, but is against the legislation because it sets a 
dangerous precedent in the fight against counterfeit products and undermines brand 
owners’ ability to take action against infringers. 
Plain Packaging in Australia, ICC, http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/ 
BASCAP/International-engagement-and-Advocacy/Plain-packaging-in-Australia/ (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2015). 
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defeating. Australia’s plain packaging scheme has not eliminated the 
use and the protection of trademarks. It just imposes special 
requirements on the use of trademarks, but does not reduce the level 
of their protection.
191
 So, the incentives for legitimate trademark 
owners to defend the distinctiveness of their brands remain intact.  
In summary, like patents and copyright, trademarks are also 
significantly impacted by technical standards. But unlike the impact 
on those two other branches of intellectual property law, the impact 
on trademarks does not depend on whether the standards are 
mandatory or voluntary. Another significant difference is that 
standards may impact on the use of trademarked distinctive signs, 
whereas the respective rights are not affected. By contrast, the 
acquisition of copyrights and the enforcement of patents may be 
constrained as a consequence of their involvement with technical 
standards, but the use of the protected assets (works and inventions) 
is not restricted. 
V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND STANDARDS: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 
The table that follows offers a bird’s eye view of the impact of 
standardization on the acquisition and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and, in the field of trademarks, on the use of the signs 
themselves. Though overly simplified, it is useful as an illustration of 
the complex relationship between intellectual property and technical 
standards, with various solutions being possible in the face of 
identical or similar circumstances. The purpose of the table is to call 
attention to the fact that the interconnection between standards and 
intellectual property may not be studied in just one or two fields, but 
should rather be approached holistically, even when such an approach 
does not necessarily solicit coherent solutions. This table and Article 
are far from exhaustive. The distortive impact of standardization 
might very well interact with other fields of intellectual property—
such as geographical indications
192
 and layout designs (topographies) 
of integrated circuits—in different ways not explored in this Article. 
 
 191. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 192. For example, a number of Muslim countries flatly prohibit the use of geographical 
indications and certification marks that designate banned substances, such as alcohol and pork. 
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Technical Standards, Intellectual Property, and Competition 
  Restrictions to 
acquisition 
Restrictions to 
enforcement 
Patents 
and 
Copyrights 
in technical 
works 
Mandatory No. Yes, compulsory licenses. 
Voluntary   
 Regarding their 
 elaboration 
No. Yes, FRANDS, hold ups, 
limitations to injunctions. 
 Regarding their use No. Yes, FRANDS, 
ambushes, limitations to 
injunctions. 
Copyrights Mandatory Yes, but 
protection 
against 
confiscation. 
Yes. 
Voluntary No. No. 
Trademarks Names of standards No. Yes, fair use. 
Third parties’ marks No. Yes, fair use. 
Service marks No. No. 
Certification marks No, but there 
may be 
encumbrances 
to use by their 
holders. 
Yes, compulsory licenses. 
 Marking and labeling 
requirements 
No, but there 
may be 
encumbrances 
to use by their 
holders. 
No. 
 
In those countries, unlike under the TPPA, technical (but morally guided) standards on package 
and labeling also impose restrictions on the registration of industrial property titles. For a 
discussion of those restrictions vis-à-vis Article 7 of the Paris Convention and Article 15.4 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, see PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 147, at 241–42.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In general, it can be said that the impact of standardization on 
intellectual property is dictated by the interference of regulation in 
free markets. Because intellectual property protects differentiation, 
and because free markets thrive on differentiation—and fail in its 
absence—market regulation is responsible for distorting free markets, 
and, thus, naturally distorts intellectual property. The distortion of 
intellectual property by standardization, perhaps the ultimate and 
most radical form of market regulation, should not come as a 
surprise. Standardization affects the manner in which intellectual 
property rights are acquired and used; including exercising the right 
to exclude others from unauthorized use, and the countervailing right 
to license. In a very narrow sense, standardization may also affect the 
way the subject matter of intellectual property rights is used in the 
field of trademarks. 
In general, except for trademarks, standards impact intellectual 
property the most when they are mandatory and, thus, acquire the 
nature of legally binding norms of conduct. The impact on 
intellectual property from voluntary standards is much less 
considerable, but it can occur in certain circumstances. 
The tension between intellectual property and standards derives 
from the inherent tension in opposing public policies. Because the 
public policies that inform standards are oriented towards reducing 
product and service differentiation, they reduce market freedom. The 
reduction in market freedom is limited, however, because standards 
are frequently adopted for technical and economic efficiency, which 
may have a downstream, positive effect on competition.
193
 For this 
reason intellectual property does not vanish completely even in the 
 
 193.  See, e.g., Ruben Schellingerhout, Standard-setting from a competition law 
perspective, COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL., 1, 3 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/publications/cpn/2011_1_1_en.pdf: 
Standards have a positive effect in the economy insofar as they promote economic 
interpenetration in the common market or encourage the development of new markets 
and improved supply conditions. Standards tend to increase competition and allow 
lower output and sales costs, thus benefiting the economy as a whole. 
Id. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Technical Standards, Intellectual Property, and Competition129 
 
 
presence of mandatory standards, and remains almost untouched in 
the context of voluntary ones.  
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